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INTRODUCTION

A

DVANCES in medical technology are usually heralded as miraculous. In recent years, however, there has been a growing
recognition that there are problems associated with these advances. With the development of medical technology such as respirators and artificial feeding techniques, physicians are now able
to sustain the bodily functions of the irreversibly comatose and
those in persistent vegetative states. During the 1970s, state legislatures began to deal with this issue by enacting "living will"
statutes.' Today, only three states do not have some form of living will statute.2 A more recent development is the durable
power of attorney for health care. 3 Although the durable power
1. For a discussion of living will statutes, see infra notes 117-32 and accompanying text.
2. See Sanford J. Schlesinger & Barbara J. Schemer, Handling Your First
Health Care Proxy, Living Will and Durable Power of Attorney, in HANDLING YOUR
FIRST HEALTH CARE PROXY, LIvING WILL, AND DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY, at

79, 127 (PLI Est. Plan. & Admin. Course Handbook Series No. 213, 1992). According to these authors, Massachusetts, Michigan, New York and Pennsylvania
did not have living will statutes as of mid-1992. Id. Pennsylvania has passed a
living will statute since that time. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 5401-5416 (Supp.
1993). The remaining three states all provide an alternative mechanism for
medical decisionmaking. Schlesinger & Scheiner, supra, at 127-28. Therefore,
as of 1992, all states have "some form of health care related legislation." Id. at

128.
3. For a discussion of durable powers of attorney for health care, see infra
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of attorney is considerably more flexible than a living will, both
documents have a major defect: they only apply to individuals
4
who have the foresight to execute them.
Despite the development of these self-determination tools,
studies suggest that as few as nine percent of the population have
executed living wills. 5 Reasons for such a limited response vary
notes 133-38 and accompanying text. Durable powers of attorney are also referred to as health care proxies.
A recently developed alternative to living wills and durable powers of attorney is the medical directive, which is also called an advance directive. See Linda
L. Emanuel & Ezekiel J. Emanuel, The Medical Directive: A New Comprehensive Advance Care Document, 261 JAMA 3288, 3288-89 (1989) (discussing problems and
limitations of living wills and durable powers of attorney statutes while advocating use of medical directives); see also PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY
OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH,
DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT 136-39 (1983) [hereinafter
DECIDING TO FOREGO TREATMENT] (describing flexibility of advance directives).

A medical directive typically has five sections: (1) an introduction, (2) a section
in which the person chooses among medical care options in several scenarios,
(3) a section designating a proxy decisionmaker, (4) a section agreeing to donate
organs, and (5) a personal statement. Emanuel & Emanuel, supra, at 3289. The
medical directive is essentially an amalgamation of a durable power of attorney
(§ 3), an organ donation directive (§ 4) and an expanded living will (§§ 2 and 5).
Although a medical directive is certainly an improvement over a simple living
will, it is no better than the sum of its parts. In addition to incorporating the
problems inherent in living wills and durable powers of attorney, the personal
statement portion of a medical directive may be ambiguous or may conflict with
the options chosen by the individual in the second section. For a discussion of
the problems identified in association with living wills and durable powers of
attorney, see infra notes 123-38 and accompanying text.
4. Two of the seminal cases regarding termination of health care treatment
concerned young women who reached majority but had never executed either a
durable power of attorney or a living will. Karen Ann Quinlan was diagnosed as
being in a persistent vegetative state at 22 years of age. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d
647, 651, 654 (NJ.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). Nancy Cruzan was 25
years old when she was resuscitated by paramedics to live thereafter in a persistent vegetative state. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 411 (Mo. 1988) (en
banc), aff'd sub nom. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261
(1990). Because Karen Quinlan and Nancy Cruzan were so young and because
the issue of health care decisionmaking had not yet reached the public consciousness, it is unlikely that either of these young women even considered
drafting a living will or durable power of attorney.
5. Steven R. Steiber, Right to Die: Public Balks at Decidingfor Others, HOSPITALS, Mar. 5, 1987, at 72, 72 (discussing poll results which indicated that
although most Americans are willing to make decisions regarding their own
health care "nearly 10 of 11 adults have not taken legal steps to see that their
wishes are fulfilled"); see also 1 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR STUDY OF ETHICAL
PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING
HEALTH CARE DECISIONS 49 n. 1l(1982) [hereinafter MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS]. The report cited a Commission survey which found that 36% of the

general public have given "instructions to someone about how they would like
to be treated if they become too sick to make decisions." Id. Only 23% of that
36%, however, had put their instructions in writing. Id. Thus, only approximately 8% of the total sample had put their preferences into writing.

HeinOnline -- 38 Vill. L. Rev. 105 1993

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38: p. 103

from ignorance to procrastination. 6 Even increased education,
however, is unlikely to significantly change these figures. For example, in the analogous area of wills, only thirty percent of the
population die with a valid will. 7 All states have intestacy laws to
provide for the distribution of the decedent's property without a
will. A comparable alternative is needed to provide for those individuals who fail to execute a living will or a durable power of
attorney.
The thesis of this Article is that decisions about medical
treatment for an incompetent person should be made within the
family. Judges, hospital ethics committees and other strangers to
the family unit should not interfere in these very personal decisions." It is the family that knows the person's preferences about
medical care. It is the family that has to live with the results of the
decisions about medical care. Therefore, it should be the family
that makes the decisions about medical care.
Part II of this Article reviews the current status of both case
law and statutory alternatives in the area of medical care decisionmaking. Part III argues that judicial decisionmaking is not objective. Rather, judges make certain assumptions that are incorrect,
and these assumptions distort the decisionmaking process. Finally, part IV proposes a statutory alternative that allows a surrogate decisionmaker to continue or terminate an individual's
medical treatment even though that person has not executed
A more recent survey by the American Medical Association found that 56%
of those surveyed had informed family members of their wishes concerning the
use of life-sustaining treatment if they entered an irreversible coma. AMERICAN
MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, PUBLIC OPINION ON HEALTH CARE ISSUES, at 29 (Apr.
1988) [hereinafter AMA PUBLIC OPINION POLL]. According to that study, however, the number who had signed a living will was still only 15%. Id. at 29-30.
6. See, e.g., Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484,489 (Cal. Ct. App.
1983) ("The lack of generalized public awareness of the statutory scheme and
the typically human characteristics of procrastination and reluctance to contemplate the need for such arrangements however makes this a tool which will all
too often go unused by those who might desire it.").
7. James N. Zartman, The Legacy of Cruzan, PROB. & PROP., May-June 1991,
at 13, 16 (observing that although "[t]he importance of wills is continually publicized ....
70% of all Americans die without a will"); cf. Steiber, supra note 5, at
72 (explaining that 52% of Americans do not have wills). The 18% discrepancy
between the percentages cited by Zartman and those cited by Steiber may occur
because the wills of spouses who die first owning only joint tenancy property are
not probated. In any case, even the 52% cited by Steiber supports the proposition that a majority of the population may die without a valid will.
8. Marc Kaufman, 'Death with Dignity' Families Tell of Their Torment, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Sept. 19, 1992, at BI (observing that families of Karen Ann Quinlan,
Nancy EllenJobes and Nancy Cruzan all "began their ordeals confident that the
medical world had their best interests at heart, but ended feeling there had to be
a better way").
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either a living will or a durable power of attorney. 9 These medical decisions regarding life-sustaining treatment would be made
without judicial intervention even if the person were a minor or
had never expressed an opinion on this issue. Thus, decisionmaking power would return to where it resided before the revolution in medical technology of the past twenty-five years-to the
family.
II.

A.

CURRENT STATUS OF THE LAW

Refusal of Medical Treatment by Competent Adults

The right of competent adults to refuse medical treatment
has two sources: the theory of informed consent and the right of
privacy. The theory of informed consent originated in the tort of
battery. 10 Historically, liability for unauthorized medical treatment was included in the tort of battery. A doctor who performed surgery without the person's consent committed a battery
even if the operation was successful." 1 In recent years, this theory
evolved into the doctrine of informed consent. 1 2 Informed consent requires the physician to inform the person of not only the
9. Traditionally, the patient's next of kin has made medical decisions for an
unconscious patient. Elaine B. Krasik, Comment, The Role of the Family in Medical
Decisionmakingfor Incompetent Adult Patients:A Historical Perspective and Case Analysis,
48 U. Prrr. L. REV. 539, 554-55 (1987). While this is the general practice,
neither the common law nor statutes authorize this alternative decisionmaking.
10. See, e.g., Perna v. Pirozzi, 457 A.2d 431, 438 (N.J. 1983) (discussing battery and negligence theories in medical malpractice case). Battery is the unconsented touching of another; damages are not required for this intentional tort.
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 9, at 41
(5th ed. 1984).
11. See, e.g., Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 489 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1983).
12. Most early cases involving nonconsensual medical treatment focused on
medical providers who violated explicit instructions of the patient regarding the

extent of the treatment. See 1 MAKING

HEALTH CARE DECISIONS,

supra note 5, at

19-20. Rarely did a court deal with the obligation of the medical provider to
disclose all relevant matters to the patient prior to receiving the patient's consent for treatment. Id. at 19.
In the latter half of the twentieth century, some courts began to refer to a
medical provider's "duty to warn" the patient of the possible complications involved in a particular treatment, prior to receiving consent to perform the treatment. Id. at 20. This reference to a duty to warn evolved into the doctrine of
informed consent which was first articulated in a 1957 California case. See Salgo
v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Cal. Ct. App.
1957). The current form of the informed consent doctrine was more fully explained by the Kansas Supreme Court a few years later. See Natanson v. Kline,
350 P.2d 1093, 1099-1107 (Kan. 1960) (indicating that to assure proper consent, physician was obligated to disclose information that reasonable physician
would disclose in similar circumstances). For a further discussion of the informed consent doctrine, see BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., LIABILITY AND QUALITY
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risks and expected benefits of the treatment, but also the alternative treatments available.' 3 The logical corollary of the right of
informed consent is the right to refuse some or all medical treatment. 14 The right of informed consent would be meaningless if
the person did not also have the option to refuse treatment. 15
The constitutional right of privacy has been evolving during
the past thirty years. Although the Constitution does not explicitly mention a right of privacy, beginning with Griswold v. ConnectiISSUES IN HEALTH CARE

322-70 (2d ed. 1991); see also 1

MAKING HEALTH CARE

DECISIONS, supra note 5, at 20-23.

13. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1064 (1972). The informed consent doctrine is based on the presumption
that a patient is competent to make his own health care decisions. Two goals are
inherent in the doctrine: personal well-being and self-determination. 1 MAKING
HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 5, at 2-3. Under the informed consent doc-

trine, a competent patient must be allowed to make his own health care decisions, but the decision can be properly made only after he is fully advised of all
"possible benefits, risks, costs, other consequences, and significant uncertainties
surrounding any of this information." Id. at 2.
In promoting expanded disclosure by physicians, the President's Commission noted that informed consent is a process requiring active participation by
both physician and patient. Id. The Commission further rejected any notion
that adequate consent to medical treatment is obtained following the mere narration of the risks of a particular procedure. Id.
Finally, informed consent does not give the patient the right to demand a
specific course of treatment. ROBERT ZUSSMAN, INTENSIVE CARE 82 (1992).

Its

primary goal is to allow patients to refuse any offered treatment. Id.
14. Barber, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 489; see also In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1222
(NJ. 1985) (noting that judicial recognition of patient's right of informed consent is significant only when right of informed refusal is also recognized).
15. Apparently, doctors do not generally agree that patients have the right
to make the choice of whether or not to proceed with a particular treatment. In
a President's Commission survey, physicians were asked to define informed consent. 1 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 5, at 17-18. The survey
results revealed that only certain percentages of physicians understood informed consent to encompass each the following: "generally informing patient
about condition and treatment (59%); disclosing treatment risks to patient
(47%); patient understanding his condition and treatment (34%); patient giving
permission for treatment (26%); and patient understanding treatment risks
(23%)." Id. at 18. Only 14% of the physicians surveyed thought informed consent required the explanation of treatment alternatives. Id. Finally, only 9%
thought that under the doctrine of informed consent, the patient had a right to
make a choice between treatment alternatives. Id.; accord ZUSSMAN, supra note
13, at 85 (quoting physician who stated, "I don't think informed consent exists
in an intensive care unit"); see also Raymond S. Duff & A.G.M. Campbell, Moral
and Ethical Dilemmas in the Special-Care Nursery, 289 NEW ENG. J. MED. 890, 893
(1973). In discussing informed consent in the context of infants, the authors
stated that "[s]ome physicians believed that parents were too upset to understand the nature of the problems and the options for care. Since they believed
informed consent had no meaning in these circumstances, they either ignored
the parents or simply told them that the child needed an operation." Id.
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cut,' 6 the Supreme Court recognized that this right exists.' 7 As
the NewJersey Supreme Court noted in In re Quinlan, 8 "this right
is broad enough to encompass a patient's decision to decline
medical treatment under certain circumstances, in much the same
way as it is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision to
terminate pregnancy under certain conditions."' 9 Additionally,
various medical professional groups have recognized that competent individuals have a right to refuse medical treatment. The
American Hospital Association has stated: "Whenever possible
. . .the authority to determine the course of treatment, if any,
should rest with the patient," and "the right to choose treatment
includes the right to refuse a specific treatment or all treatment." 20
Bouvia v. Superior Court 2 1 is instructive on the right of a competent adult to refuse medical treatment. Elizabeth Bouvia was
born with severe cerebral palsy. 22 Because she could not retain
sufficient food, doctors inserted a nasogastric tube against her
will. 23 Ms. Bouvia petitioned to have the tube removed but the
trial court denied her request. 24 The trial court found that she
was not in "great physical discomfort" and that she tolerated the
feeding tube "reasonably well." 2 5 The California Court of Appeal reversed, holding that because Bouvia was competent, she
had the absolute right to decide to terminate any type of medical
treatment.2 6 The court stated unequivocally that this was neither
a medical decision to be made by her physicians or a hospital ethics committee, nor a legal issue to be resolved by judges. 2 7 The
16.
17.
18.
19.

381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Id. at 485.
355 A.2d 647 (NJ.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
Id. at 663 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973)).

20. AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, THE AHA POLICY AND STATEMENT OF
PATIENTS' CHOICES OF TREATMENT OPTIONS (Feb. 1985), quoted in Bouvia v. Su-

perior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 303 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
21. 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
22. Id. at 299. At the time she filed suit, 28-year-old Elizabeth Bouvia was a
quadriplegic, immobile except for a few fingers and some slight head movements. Id. at 299-300. She also suffered from crippling arthritis. Id. at 300.
Due to the intense pain caused by her condition, periodic doses of morphine
were injected through a tube permanently inserted into her chest. Id. The morphine was successful in dissipating only some of her discomfort. Id. The court
found that she was mentally competent at the time of trial. Id.
23. Id. at 298. A nasogastric tube provides a mechanism through which the
person can be fed a liquid, nutritionally balanced diet without the need to chew
and swallow.
24. Id. at 299.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 300-01.
27. Id. at 305.

HeinOnline -- 38 Vill. L. Rev. 109 1993

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38: p. 103

decision was Elizabeth Bouvia's alone. The appellate court particularly criticized the trial court's consideration of Bouvia's "ability to tolerate physical discomfort." 28 The court noted that it
would be inhumane for a physician to force a person to accept
medical treatment, perhaps for fifteen or twenty years, when her
prognosis was so bleak. The court recognized that it would be
Bouvia who would be living her life under these circumstances
29
and not the physicians.
Both the doctrine of informed consent and the right of privacy require the same result. When a person is competent, the
decision to continue or terminate treatment is the person's alone.
B.

Termination of Medical Treatmentfor Incompetent Adults

State courts have long wrestled with the issue of when to allow families to terminate medical treatment for incompetent persons; yet, the standards vary immensely between states, and
indeed between judges in a single state.3 0 Two basic tests have
28. Id. at 299.
29. Id. at 305. Although Elizabeth Bouvia was victorious in her quest to
elect to have the feeding tube removed, she decided not to do so and remains
alive today. See Beverly Beyette, The Reluctant Survivor, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 13,
1992, at El. Ms. Bouvia states she wants to die, but she believes that "now the
business of dying is too physically painful." Id.
30. The New Jersey Supreme Court has been in the forefront of analyzing
the issue of when to allow family members to order the removal of medical treatment for their relatives. Initially the NewJersey courts adopted the test referred
to as the substituted judgment test. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (N.J.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 922 (196). For a discussion of the substituted judgment test,
see infra notes 31-50 and accompanying text. Later, the NewJersey court developed a three-part analytical framework that allowed consideration of both the
substituted judgment and the best interests tests. In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209
(N.J. 1985). Using this framework, the first option available to the court is, in
essence, a substituted judgment test. The first option can be used if there is
clear evidence that the incompetent patient would have refused treatment under
the circumstances. Id. at 1229-3 1. If clear evidence is absent, the treatment cannot be terminated under the first option. If treatment cannot be terminated
under the first option, then under a second option, the "limited objective" test,
the treatment can be withdrawn upon a showing of trustworthy evidence of the
patient's intent coupled with a showing that the burden of maintaining life outweighs the benefit to the patient. Id. at 1232. The evidence required by this
"limited objective" test would be "[e]vidence that, taken as a whole, would be
too vague, casual, or remote to constitute the clear proof" of intent. Id. The
balancing of burdens against the benefits means that the pain the patient is suffering "markedly outweigh[s] any physical pleasure, emotional enjoyment, or
intellectual satisfaction that the patient may still be able to derive from life." Id.
The third option of the framework is to be used only in the absence of any evidence of patient intent. In that case, treatment may be withdrawn when the
effect of administering such treatment is inhumane due to severe, recurring and
unavoidable pain. Id. The Conroy court ultimately held that the evidence at trial
was inadequate to satisfy any of the three tests; the court would have refused to
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emerged: the substituted judgment test and the best interests
test.
1. The SubstitutedJudgment Test
The substituted judgment analysis was first applied in a right
to die case 31 by the New Jersey Supreme Court in 1976.32 Substituted judgment is a subjective test, unique to each individual person's desires and personal value system. The goal of substituted
judgment is to determine, insofar as possible, what the incompetent person would have decided if he were competent. 33 The
question is not whether a reasonable or average person would
have decided to terminate treatment, but whether this particular
person would have decided to continue or terminate treatment. 34
This analysis requires the surrogate decisionmaker to determine
whether the person, prior to becoming incompetent, had expressed any views on what his decision would be under such
allow cessation of feeding had Ms. Conroy survived the proceedings. Id. at
1243.
In Conroy, Justice Handler criticized the objective tests (second and third
options) for focusing on pain as the decisive element. Id. at 1247 (Handler, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Handler argued that the focus
on pain eclipsed the multitude of human values that should be considered in any
decision on termination of medical treatment. Id. (Handler, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). Finally, he noted that medical professionals often
have difficulty determining the extent of pain suffered by a patient. Id. (Handler,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Two years later, the New Jersey Supreme Court limited the application of
the third portion of the Conroy test, referred to as the "pure-objective" test, finding that its use was not appropriate when the patient was in a persistent vegetative state; in those cases, the substituted judgment test articulated in Quinlan was
to be used. In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 443 (N.J. 1987); see also In re Peter, 529
A.2d 419, 425 (N.J. 1987) (indicating that Quinlan provides test for patient in
persistent vegetative state); accord Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 582 (D.R.I.
1988) (suggesting that third part of Conroy test was useless as applied to patients
in vegetative states because by definition, they were unable to experience pain).
31. The substituted judgment analysis had long been utilized in making financial decisions for incompetent individuals. Superintendent of Belchertown
State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 431 (Mass. 1977). The doctrine has
also been used to justify kidney donation by an incompetent individual for the
purpose of a transplant. Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969).
32. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 664. The Quinlan court did not, however, refer to
the test as substituted judgment at that time. Instead, the court ruled that the
"guardian and family of Karen [should] render their best judgment, subject to
the qualifications hereinafter stated, as to whether she would exercise it in these
circumstances." Id. Eleven years later, the New Jersey Supreme Court noted
that the approach it used in Quinlan is known as the substituted judgment test.
Jobes, 529 A.2d at 444.
33. Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1229.
34. Id.
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5

circumstances .
Under the substituted judgment test, the decisionmaker need
not be a family member. In fact, a guardian who has never met
the person may be appointed to make the decision. 3 6 Because the
guardian may never have met the person as a competent individual, the guardian must rely on statements by family members
about the person's moral and religious views as well as any statements about what the individual would have wanted in the particular situation. Typically, family members base their opinions
about the person's beliefs on their prior conversations with the
person about similar publicized cases or about medical treatment
37
administered to friends or family.
There are two major problems inherent in the substituted
judgment approach. The first problem is that it is impossible to
know with certainty what decision anyone would make in a particular circumstance. On a metaphysical level, some have argued
that it is impossible for anyone to know how he would feel in a
situation until he has been in the situation.3 8 Thus, supporters of
this view maintain that courts and families are merely comforting
themselves when they say that they are discontinuing life support
because that is what the person would have wanted.3 9 On a more
35. See Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 430 (declaring that purpose of substituted
judgment test is to determine wants and needs of person); see alsoJobes, 529 A.2d
at 444-49 (holding that patient's family, as party most familiar with patient's
desires, was allowed to remove feeding tube).
36. See, e.g., In re Greenspan, 558 N.E.2d 1194, 1199-1200 (Ill. 1990)
(granting public guardian standing to petition for cessation of artificial hydration and nutrition even though patient's wife and children were living).
37. See, e.g., Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1230 (listing, among other avenues of
evincing intent, statements voiced by individual regarding treatment given to
others); see also In re Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 299 (Ill. 1989) (stating that
surrogate decisionmaker should initially determine if person made any explicit
statements regarding medical treatment). In Longeway, the Illinois Supreme
Court adopted the substituted judgment approach and remanded the case to
allow the guardian of a 76-year-old woman to demonstrate by "any reliable and
relevant evidence" the patient's intent. Id. at 300.
38. Donald L. Beschle, Autonomous Decisionmakingand Social Choice: Examining
the "Right to Die", 77 Ky. L.J. 319, 342-46 (1988-89) (arguing that because we
cannot conceive of our own death, we cannot really make informed choice to
die); see also In re Westchester County Medical Ctr., 531 N.E.2d 607, 614-16
(N.Y. 1988) (refusing to grant family's petition to prevent insertion of feeding
tube because court found prior statements made by patient were not clear and
convincing evidence that she would want to die in specific circumstances
presented by her illness).
39. Beschle, supra note 38, at 346-50. Beschle argues that courts avoid exerting responsible judicial power by saying that they are just doing what the
individual would have wanted. Id. at 346. Beschle further claims that courts and
litigants avoid responsibility for their actions by stating that they are merely exercising the rights of an individual patient. Id. at 348-49.
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practical level, many people never express their preferences for
treatment if they were to become incompetent. 40 In addition,
there are those who were never able to express a preference,
4
namely minors and the mentally handicapped. '
This inability to know another's choice was documented in a
1988 study. The study detailed patient treatment preferences
and knowledge of those preferences by the patient's doctor and
spouse. 42 In five of six treatment scenarios, the doctor's prediction of patient preference was no better than chance. 43 While
spouses were significantly more successful in determining patient
preferences than doctors, their predictions were still better than
44
chance in only half of the scenarios.
The second problem with the substituted judgment test is
that different courts require different levels of proof as to the per45
son's intent. Some states require clear and convincing evidence
40. Only a bare majority (56%) of the population have told family members their wishes concerning the use of life-sustaining treatment if they were in a
coma from which doctors do not believe they could recover. AMA PUBLIC OPINION POLL, supra note 5, at 29. Adults between the ages of 18 and 34 were even
less likely to have discussed their wishes with their family. Id. In any case, these
expressions would probably be inadequate in light of In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d
647 (NJ.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976) and In reJobes, 529 A.2d 434 (N.J.
1987). For examples of statements that courts considered inadequate, see infra
notes 47-57 and accompanying text.
41. Some courts have used the substituted judgment test in situations involving children and the mentally retarded even though it is illogical to determine what one would do in a particular situation when that person has never
been capable of rationally considering the issue. See, e.g., In re Minor, 434
N.E.2d 601, 609 (Mass. 1982) (stating in case involving four-month-old patient
that court "must attempt to 'don the mental mantle' of the child and seek to act
on the same motives and considerations as would have moved the child"); Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 431-32
(Mass. 1977) (utilizing substituted judgment approach to determine that mentally retarded adult would not want chemotherapy). But see In re Storar, 420
N.E.2d 64, 73 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981). In Storar, the New York
Court of Appeals recognized the limitations of the substituted judgment test in
considering the situation of a 52-year-old man with a mental age of 18 months.
Id. at 68. The court said it was "unrealistic to attempt to determine whether he
would want to continue potentially life prolonging treatment if he were competent. . . . [T]hat would be similar to asking whether 'if it snowed all summer
would it then be winter?' " Id. at 72-73.
42. Richard F. Uhlmann et al., Physicians' and Spouses' Predictions of Elderly
Patients'ResuscitationPreferences, 43J. GERONTOLOGY: MED. Sci., M 115 (1988) (discussing inaccuracy of substituted judgments, but suggesting that such decisions
could be made more accurate through increased communication with patient
and shared decisionmaking by both physician and family).
43. Id. at Ml17.
44. Id. at M 117, M120. Also noteworthy was the fact that spouses were
much more likely to be "uncertain" of the patient's response than the doctor,
even though the doctors' predictions were less likely to be accurate. Id. at M 117.
45. See, e.g., Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 691 (Ariz. 1987) (en
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while others are satisfied with a lower standard of proof.46 Regardless of which standard a court has articulated, however,
courts have been erratic in their determinations of what types of
evidence are considered reliable. Courts look not only at the person's words but also at the context in which the words were spoken. Among the factors that enter into the equation are: the
maturity of the person at the time he made a statement, the remoteness in time of the remarks from the person's illness, the
consistency among remarks made at different times and the seriousness of the remarks. As one court noted, "an offhand remark
about not wanting to live under certain circumstances made by a
person when young and in the peak of health" would not be sufficient twenty years later when family members were seeking to discontinue life-sustaining treatment even if the circumstances were
virtually identical. 4 7 The specificity of the statements also affects
the probative value of the statements. 48 Casual statements made
in general terms are usually not adequate. 49 For example, an individual's statement that he would not want to be artificially sustained by heroic measures if his condition were hopeless would
probably be too general to support a request to discontinue
treatment. 50
Does the comment "I wouldn't want to live like a vegetable,"
provide sufficient evidence of the individual's intent if the comment was made after watching a news special on the topic of withdrawing treatment? Does the answer to the preceding question
depend on whether the news special discussed disconnecting a
respirator and not artificial nutrition? Is a college paper advocating euthanasia adequate? The answers depend on the court.
The most famous case to tackle such questions was the Quinlan case. In its opinion, the New Jersey Supreme Court did not
quote the actual statements of Karen Ann Quinlan. 51 The court
simply noted that there was evidence that Karen made statements
while she was competent that indicated "her distaste for continubanc) (stating that court has "recognized the need for a higher standard [of evidence] in exceptional civil matters"); In re Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 300 (Ill.
1989) (noting that although "actual, specific express intent" is not necessary,
some other "clear and convincing evidence" is).
46. See, e.g., Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 635
(Mass. 1986) (describing evidence of intent to terminate treatment as "ample").
47. In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1230 (N.J. 1985).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1231.
50. Id. at 1231 n.7.
51. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (NJ.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
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ance of life by extraordinary medical procedures, under circumstances not unlike those of the present case." 5 2 The statements
were made during conversations about others who were terminally ill and were being subjected to similar heroic measures. The
court, however, rejected reliance on these statements because
they were "remote and impersonal" and "lacked significant probative weight." 5 3 Some judges take an even more rigid position,
refusing to discontinue treatment unless the person specifically
addressed the type of treatment being received and knew all the
consequences of the specific decision. 54 In essence, these judges
would create a standard more stringent than that required for informed consent.
The New Jersey court again faced the issue of determining
the evidentiary adequacy of prior statements in In re Jobes.5 5 In
Jobes, the court heard testimony regarding several conversations
Nancy Jobes had with friends beginning in 1971.56 In one conversation she told a friend that if she were crippled with multiple
sclerosis or muscular dystrophy, she would not want to live. In
discussing the Quinlan case, Jobes said that she would not want to
live like Karen Ann Quinlan did after her respirator was removed.
Later, after watching a friend on a respirator suffer from amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, Jobes commented that she would not
52. Id. at 653.
53. Id. Nine years after Quinlan, however, in Conroy, the New Jersey
Supreme Court declared:
[W]e now believe that we were in error in Quinlan . .. to disregard
evidence of statements that Ms. Quinlan made to friends concerning
artificial prolongation of the lives of others who were terminally ill....
Such evidence is certainly relevant to shed light on whether the patient
would have consented to the treatment if competent to make the
decision.
Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1230.
In re Westchester County Medical Ctr., 531 N.E.2d 607, 608
54. See, e.g.,
(N.Y. 1988) (refusing to allow patient's daughters to prevent artificial feeding
because "there [was] not clear and convincing proof that the patient had made a
firm and settled commitment, while competent, to decline this type of medical
assistance under circumstances such as these"); see also Brophy v. New England
Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 640 (Mass. 1986) (Nolan, J., dissenting). In
Brophy, the dissent found no evidence that Paul Brophy ever declared his intentions as to life-sustaining treatment, nor any evidence that he knew of the pain of
death after removal of treatment. Id. (Nolan, J., dissenting). The dissent believed that without this evidence, a successful argument could be made that
Brophy never made his own determination whether food or water should be
removed. Id. (Nolan, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the statements Brophy
made, see infra note 60.
55. 529 A.2d 434 (NJ. 1987).
56. Id. at 442.
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want to be kept alive under those circumstances.5 7 Nonetheless,
the court characterized these statements as "remote, general,
spontaneous, and made in casual circumstances." 5 8 With those
conclusory statements, the court dismissed Jobes' statements as
unreliable. 59
In contrast, the New York Court of Appeals held that statements made by a Catholic Brother about the Quinlan case exhibited clear and convincing evidence of his intent to forego the use
of "extraordinary life support measures."' 60 During discussions
within his religious community, Brother Fox said that "he would
not want any of this 'extraordinary business' done for him under
those circumstances." 6 1
It is difficult to distinguish the statements made by Nancy
Jobes from those of Brother Fox. Even though Jobes was young
when she entered a persistent vegetative state, her prior statements were more specific and were repeated several times over a
longer period of time then were the statements made by Brother
Fox. Because Fox was older, was a priest and made the statements to others within his religious community, the court apparently assumed that he had thought more carefully about issues of
life and death. As a practical matter, Fox's situation appears to be
an anomaly. If the validity of statements were dependent on the
age and circumstances of the declarant, treatment could never be
discontinued for any young adult who had failed to execute a living will.
As implemented, the substituted judgment test has proved
57. Id.

58. Id. at 443.
59. Id.

60. In re Eichner, 420 N.E.2d 64, 72 (N.Y.) (decided with In re Storar)

("These were obviously solemn pronouncements and not casual remarks made
at some social gathering, nor can it be said that he was too young to realize or
feel the consequences of his statements .. "),cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981);
see also Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 632 n.22
(Mass. 1986). Paul Brophy had also discussed Karen Quinlan's situation with his
wife and stated: "I don't ever want to be on a life support system." Id. Several
years later, Brophy helped rescue a man from a burning truck. The man died
from extensive burns. Brophy discarded his award for bravery and said, "I
should have been five minutes later." Id. Within hours after being hospitalized
with a ruptured aneurysm he said to a daughter, "If I can't sit up to kiss one of
my beautiful daughters, I may as well be six feet under." Id. The court noted
that "[allthough he never had discussed specifically whether a G-tube or feeding
tube should be withdrawn in the event that he was diagnosed as being in a persistent vegetative state following his surgery .... if presently competent, Brophy
would choose to forgo artificial nutrition." Id. at 632.
61. Eichner, 420 N.E.2d at 68.
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unworkable for two reasons. First, it is impossible to know with
any degree of certainty how an individual would want to be
treated if faced with a specific illness. Second, the substituted
judgment test has been inconsistently applied by judges who are
uncomfortable with the idea of terminating life support. Thus, an
alternative is needed for the traditional substituted judgment test.
2.

The Best Interests Test

The best interests approach is an objective test. The test requires the decisionmaker to determine the course of medical care
based on the goals of "relief from suffering, preservation or restoration of functioning, and quality and extent of sustained
life." 62 Courts must balance the pain the person is subjected to
against the beneficial effects of the treatment. 6 3 This test is primarily used when the person has never expressed any views on
the issue or has never been competent to express any preference
on medical treatment. 6 4 The best interests approach, however, is
also seriously flawed.
The first problem with the best interests approach is that it is
not really an objective test. Although the courts present the illusion that they are objectively considering the circumstances, the
reality is that the person is at the mercy of the judge and the
judge's value system. Intimately intertwined with any decision in
the best interests of the person is a value judgment as to what is
"best." A best interests standard assumes a consensus that does
not exist in society on the issue of whether to discontinue treatment. 65 People have "different ideas about how the value of life
is affected by the loss of brain function, the loss of cognitive abili66
ties, bodily deterioration, or unrelievable pain."
62. In re Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 299 (Ill. 1989) (quoting Rasmussen v.
Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 689 (Ariz. 1987) (en banc)).
63. See, e.g., In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 73 (N.Y.) (approving, over patient's
mother's objections, blood transfusions to profoundly retarded 52-year-old man
suffering from bladder cancer because transfusions kept patient alive and were
judged not excessively intrusive), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
64. In In re Minor, 434 N.E.2d 601, 602 (Mass. 1982), doctors had requested a "do not resuscitate" (DNR) order for a four-month-old abandoned
baby with serious cardiac problems. In granting the request, the court noted
that when a young child is involved, substituted judgment (the standard in Massachusetts) was "consistent" with the best interests test because "the criteria to
be examined and the basic applicable reasoning are the same." Id. at 608 n. 10;
cf Storar, 420 N.E.2d at 73 (stating that patient's pain was one factor but not
necessarily determinative).
65. In reJobes, 529 A.2d 434, 458 (NJ. 1987) (Handler, J., concurring).
66. Id. at 457-58 (Handler, J., concurring).
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The second problem with the best interests test is that there
is rarely one correct medical solution for any health problem. For
example, mild diabetes can be controlled by diet, by injectable

natural insulin or by oral synthetic insulin. 67 Doctors disagree as
to whether back problems are better treated with surgery or with
medication and bed rest. 68 There is continuing controversy
69
about whether gynecologists perform too many hysterectomies
70
and whether obstetricians perform too many caesarean sections.
It is inescapable that physicians' treatment decisions reflect their
values: for example, their preference for surgery over the natural
healing processes of the body. 7 1 The question becomes infinitely
more complex when the termination of medical treatment is
involved.
The case of John Storar is instructive regarding the lack of
objectivity in the best interests approach. 72 Storar was a severely
retarded individual who had lived in a state facility for forty-seven
years. 73 After being diagnosed with bladder cancer, he received
radiation therapy and also required blood transfusions as his disease progressed.7 4 Even with the transfusions, however, his life
expectancy was predicted to be only three to six months. Storar
also received regular doses of narcotics to control his pain. 75 Because he found the transfusions "disagreeable," 76 his mother re67. 1 MAKING

HEALTH CARE DECISIONS,

supra note 5,at 42.

68. Id. at 43.
69. See generally Gina Kolata, Rate of Hysterectomies Puzzles Experts, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 20, 1988, at Cl. The article noted that there are substantial differences in
the rate of hysterectomies between different regions of the country. Id. Furthermore, the article noted that in 1988, the American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists formed a task force to determine whether too many unnecessary
hysterectomies are being performed. Id.
70. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CESAREAN CHILDBIRTH (1981) (discussing concern regarding increased rate of caesareans performed, recommending steps to lower such rates and articulating diverse views
on caesarean controversy).

71. 1

MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS,

supra note 5, at 42 (arguing that

many treatment decisions are not supported by medical data or professional
standards, and merely represent matter of choice).
72. In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
73. Id. at 68.
74. Id. at 69.
75. Id.
76. John Storar found the transfusions so unpleasant that he had to be
physically restrained during the procedure to prevent him from injuring himself
by pulling the needle out of his arm. Id. at 78 (Jones, J., dissenting in part).
Urination became very painful for him because of the clotting in his urine. Id.
(Jones, J., dissenting in part). The pain associated with the transfusions also
affected him emotionally. Id. (Jones, J., dissenting in part). He changed from
being outgoing to being withdrawn. Id. (Jones, J., dissenting in part).
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quested that they be discontinued. 7 7 The New York Court of
Appeals recognized that some doctors believed that treatment of
bladder cancer could properly be limited to pain relievers because, at an advanced stage, transfusions only prolonged the person's suffering. 78 The court, however, discounted that alternative
and stated that it would not "allow an incompetent patient to
bleed to death." 79 This is a classic example of a situation where
there were two reasonable treatment choices; yet, the court intervened and substituted its judgment for that of the patient's
mother who had visited him almost every day since he had been
institutionalized.
The best interests approach is inherently unworkable. It is
not an objective test because judges cannot avoid interjecting
their personal values into the decisionmaking process. Moreover,
even physicians are incapable of reaching a consensus about
treatment in many situations. In a diverse society, there is no one
"best" answer. There is only a range of answers that society has
deemed acceptable; within this range, the best answer is only one
person's judgment. Thus, a replacement is needed for the best
interests approach as well as the substituted judgment test.
C.

Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health

In 1990, the United States Supreme Court had the opportunity to stabilize this area of law and provide consistent guidelines
in the case of Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health.80 Instead of providing a clear framework for addressing these difficult
situations, however, the Court left the judicial determination of
these private medical decisions in the hands of the individual
states. As noted in the previous section, this approach resulted in
a patchwork of inconsistent tests.
Cruzan is a very limited decision. The only question the
Court decided was whether the United States Constitution gives a
77. Id. at 69.
78. Id. at 69-70.
79. Id. at 73. The court relied on several cases where courts had authorized
blood transfusions for children who were Jehovah's Witnesses even though the
parents objected to transfusions as contrary to their religious beliefs. See, e.g., In
re Sampson, 278 N.E.2d 918, 918-19 (N.Y. 1972) (refusing to honor parents'
religious objections because transfusions were necessary part of surgery for
child). The Storar court ignored a very significant distinction: in the Jehovah's
Witnesses' cases, the patients were likely to recover if given the transfusions,
while John Storar would merely live for three to six months while suffering
intensely.
80. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
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conservator the right to terminate life-sustaining treatment for a
person in a persistent vegetative state. 8 ' The Court concluded
82
that the Constitution does not give a conservator such a right.
As a practical matter, Cruzan did not change the law in any jurisdiction. The Court merely decided that each state could make its
own rules on the question of termination of life-sustaining
83
treatment.
Nancy Cruzan was8 4 in a persistent vegetative state8 5 as a result of an automobile accident. Although her respiratory and circulatory systems were not being artificially maintained, she was
being sustained by artificial nutrition through a gastrostomy feeding and hydration tube.8 6 Her parents, as guardians, sought to
remove the gastrostomy tube. The Supreme Court of Missouri
held that clear and convincing evidence of Ms. Cruzan's desire to
have life-sustaining treatment withdrawn was required before her
87
parents could terminate artificial feeding and nutrition.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the question of "whether Cruzan has a right under the
United States Constitution which would require the hospital to
withdraw life-sustaining treatment from her under these circumstances." ' 8 In other words, the issue addressed was "whether the
United States Constitution grants what is in common parlance re81. Id. at 269.
82. Id. at 280.
83. Id. at 285-87.
84. Nancy Cruzan died on December 26, 1990. Joyce Price, Cruzan Dies After 12 Days, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1990, at Al. After the United States Supreme
Court decision was issued, her parents returned to the trial court and presented
additional evidence that Nancy would not want to be maintained in a persistent
vegetative state. Id. The trial court found that this evidence satisfied the requirement of clear and convincing evidence. Id. On December 14, 1990, the
court gave permission to terminate her treatment. Id.
85. In a vegetative state, only the body's internal controls are functioning.
In reJobes, 529 A.2d 434, 438 (N.J. 1987). Heart function, digestion, low level
nerve response and body temperature are all maintained. Id. The body, however, does not otherwise exhibit any awareness of the environment in which it is
located. Id. A person in a vegetative state may appear to be reacting to sound or
painful stimuli, but the movements are merely reflexive, not a purposeful reaction to any sensation. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 301 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Ronald E. Cranford, The Persistent Vegetative State: The Medical Reality (Getting
the Facts Straight), HASTINGS CENTER REP., Feb.-Mar. 1988, at 27, 28, 31). Individuals in persistent vegetative states are completely unaware of anything that
may be occurring around them. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
86. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 266.
87. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 424 (Mo. 1988) (en banc), aff'd sub
nom. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
88. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269.
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ferred to as a 'right to die.' "89

Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion traced the history of the
right to refuse treatment from the earliest "consent" cases to
Quinlan9° and In re Longeway. 9 1 Significantly, the Court recognized that the "common-law doctrine of informed consent is
viewed as generally encompassing the right of a competent individual to refuse medical treatment." 92 The Court then noted that
the Fourteenth Amendment provides a constitutionally protected
liberty interest in refusing treatment. 93 These may have been the
94
most important statements in the case.
The inference generally drawn from prior decisions was that
a competent individual had the right to refuse medical treatment. 95 The most frequently cited of those decisions is the
United States Supreme Court decision in Union Pacific Railway v.
Botsford.96 In Botsford the Court said: "No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the
right of every individual to the possession and control of his own
97
person, free from all restraint or interference of others."
Cruzan, however, was the first case in which the Supreme Court
explicitly stated, although in dicta, that a competent individual
has the right to decide whether to refuse medical treatment.
The Cruzan Court then discussed whether an incompetent
person has the same right to refuse medical treatment as a competent person. The Court summarily dismissed the suggestion
that an incompetent individual has this right because it "begs the
question."9 8 The Court noted that, by definition, an incompetent
89. Id. at 277.
90. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
91. In re Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292 (Il. 1989).
92. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 277.
93. Id. at 278 (stating that "[tihe principle that a competent person has a
constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions").
94. The Court also apparently recognized that food and water could, under
certain circumstances, be terminated. Id. at 279.
95. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (N.J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
One well known formulation of the principle of patient self-determination was
articulated by Justice Cardozo who stated: "Every human being of adult years
and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body."
Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).
96. 141 U.S. 250 (1891). Botsford was a personal injury case in which the
defendant moved to compel the physical examination of the plaintiff. Id. at 250.
The Court affirmed the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion. Id. at 257.
97. Id. at 251.
98. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280.
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person cannot exercise any rights. 9 9 With that brief discussion of
the major constitutional question, the Court abruptly concluded
its discussion of whether an incompetent individual can refuse
treatment.
The Court next discussed the question of whether the United
States Constitution was violated by Missouri's requirement of
clear and convincing evidence of the person's wishes prior to allowing termination of life support. In upholding Missouri's right
to require such a stringent level of proof in a civil proceeding, the
Court looked to the state interest that Missouri was attempting to
protect. 0 0 The Court provided examples of other non-criminal
situations where clear and convincing evidence was properly required. 1 1 The Court concluded that Nancy Cruzan's (and society's) interest in making such a determination was more
substantial than the mere loss of money at issue in other types of
civil disputes. 0 2 Consequently, the Court held that the burden of
proof reflected Missouri's determination "about how the risk of
error should be distributed between the litigants."' 0 3 The Court
buttressed its decision with this statement:
An erroneous decision not to terminate results in a
maintenance of the status quo; the possibility of subsequent developments such as advancements in medical
science, the discovery of new evidence regarding the patient's intent, changes in the law, or simply the unexpected death of the patient despite the administration of
life-sustaining treatment at least create the potential that
a wrong decision will eventually be corrected or its im99. Id. But see id. at 309 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (finding that person does
not lose constitutional rights in other areas merely because he is incompetent).
100. Id. at 280. For a discussion of the four most commonly articulated
state interests related to medical decisionmaking, see infra notes 195-216 and
accompanying text.
101. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 282-83 (comparing to clear and convincing evidence burden of proof in deportation, denaturalization, termination of parental
rights and civil commitment proceedings).
102. Id. at 283.
103. Id. (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 755 (1982)). The dissenters disagreed with the majority's reliance on the cases cited to uphold Missouri's burden. For example, Justice Brennan stated:
In the cases cited by the majority, the imbalance imposed by a heightened evidentiary standard was not only acceptable but required because the standard was deployed to protect an individual's exercise of a
fundamental right, as the majority admits. In contrast, the Missouri
court imposed a clear and convincing standard as an obstacle to the
exercise of a fundamental right.
Id. at 319-20 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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pact mitigated. An erroneous decision to withdraw lifesustaining treatment, however, is not susceptible of
correction. 104
This statement drew some of the strongest objections from the
dissenters. 0 5 The assumptions of the Justices that underlie the
majority's statement are the focus of Part III of this Article. 10 6
Except for the dicta that a competent individual has the right
to refuse medical treatment and the Court's implied approval of
withdrawal of food and water, Cruzan is not particularly important
for what it mandates. Rather, the decision is important for the
areas it leaves open to the states. First, a state may be constitutionally required to implement the decisions of a surrogate appointed by the person. 0 7 Second, the states are free to develop
other mechanisms that would allow the termination of medical
treatment even though the person is incompetent. 0 8 Thus,
Cruzan does not prevent a state from taking any action. Rather, it
gives states the opportunity to develop solutions to this difficult
problem.
D.

Current Statutory Solutions

In response to this issue, state legislatures have adopted
three methods of addressing the problem of termination of medical treatment for incompetent persons. Living wills and durable
powers of attorney, the most common solutions, are seriously
flawed. These statutes are valueless for those who have not had
the foresight to execute such an instrument. 0 9 Moreover, the
104. Id. at 283.
105. Id. at 320-21 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
106. For a discussion of these assumptions, see infra notes 185-282 and accompanying text.
107. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 289, 292 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
108. Id. at 292 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor's language on
an incompetent individual's right to terminate treatment is particularly noteworthy. She specifically refers to an "incompetent individual's liberty interest in
refusing medical treatment." Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). Thus, she recognized a right which the majority had dismissed. See id. at 280.
109. See, e.g., id. at 268-69 (indicating that Missouri Supreme Court found
that state living will statute embodied state policy in favor of preserving life and
state policy requiring surrogate decisionmaker to provide clear and convincing
evidence of individual's desires absent presence of document satisfying statutory
requirements). For a discussion of the Cruzan case, see supra notes 80-108 and
accompanying text.
A similar problem is encountered in the area of wills. The majority of people do not execute a will. Society, however, does not hold property in permanent limbo or require its escheat to the state merely because the individual did
not utilize good judgment and execute a will. Rather, society has statutorily des-
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statutes do not benefit children, the mentally handicapped or
those who have never been competent."l 0
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws has approved the Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill
Act (URTA)."'1 The URTA provides for declarations similar to
2
living wills and durable powers of attorney for health care. 1 It
also includes an alternative procedure for individuals who have
not executed a declaration." t1 Only thirteen states 14 have
adopted the URTA, however, and all but two have made significant changes. 1 5 Consequently, there are almost as many different versions of the URTA as there are states that have enacted it.
Seventeen legislatures have made halting steps towards solving the problem of termination of medical treatment for incompetent individuals who have not executed some written
declaration. 1 6 However, even these progressive statutes have
flaws. Thus, in most jurisdictions individuals remain captives of
the medical or judicial systems. The remaining portions of this
ignated the family members who will receive property in the absence of a will.
Although the historical development flowed from intestacy to wills rather than
the other way around, the fact remains that people had the choice of determining their property disposition upon death or relying on some statutory provision
to make that decision for them.
110. See, e.g., In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858
(1981). For a discussion of the Storar case, see supra notes 72-79 and accompanying text.
111. UNIF. RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL ACT, 9B U.L.A. 96 (West Supp.
1992). The URTA was first approved in 1985. Id. It was superseded by the
1989 version. Id.
112. Id. §2.
113. Id. § 7.
114. ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.12.010-.100 (1991); ARK. CODE. ANN. §§ 20-17201 to -217 (Michie 1991); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7194.5 (West
Supp. 1993); IOWA CODE §§ 144A.1-.11 (1989 & Supp. 1993); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18-A, §§ 5-701 to -714 (West Supp. 1992); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 459.010.055 (1992); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-9-101 to -206 (1991); NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 20-402 to -416 (Supp. 1992); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 449.535-.690 (1991); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-01 to -14 (1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2133.01-.15
(Anderson Supp. 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 3101-3111 (West Supp.
1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 23-4.11-1 to -14 (Supp. 1992).
115. Maine and Montana are the only two states that adopted the URTA
without substantial changes. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, §§ 5-701 to -714;
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-9-101 to -206. Alaska, Missouri, North Dakota and
Oklahoma deleted § 7 of the URTA which allows the withdrawal of treatment by
a family member even if the patient has not executed a declaration. See ALASKA
STAT. §§ 18.12.010-.100; Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 459.010-.055; N.D. CENT. CODE
§§ 23-06.4-01 to -14; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 3101-3111.
116. For a discussion of these statutory attempts to address the need for a
more flexible approach, see infra notes 139-48 and accompanying text.
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part describe the legislative steps taken to provide assistance to
those making health care determination decisions.
1. Living Wills
A living willl" 7 is a written statement signifying that an individual does not want life-sustaining medical treatment" 8 if the
individual is suffering from a terminal injury or illness.' 19 A living
will generally requests that the person be given comfort care including necessary pain relieving medications.' 2 0 The first living
will statute was enacted by California in 1976.121 Although there
are substantial variations among the statutes, today forty-seven
states and the District of Columbia have some version of a living

will law. 122
117. "Living will" is the term generally used by the public although only a
few statutes use the term. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-103(4) (Supp.
1992) (defining "living will" as "written declaration" of person's preferences for
medical treatment). Most statutes use the terms "declaration" or "directive" to
describe a living will. See, e.g., AL. CODE § 22-8A-4 (1990) (defining declaration
as written document directing "withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures in a terminal condition"); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.610 (1990) (defining directive as written document expressing individual's wish to withhold or withdraw lifesustaining procedures).
118. Statutes use a variety of terms which refer to life-sustaining medical
treatment. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-570(1) (Supp. 1993) ("life support
systems"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.101 (11) (West Supp. 1993) ("life-prolonging
procedure"); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 702(d) (1991) ("death delaying

procedures"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-321(a)(2) (1990) ("extraordinary means");
OR. REV. STAT. § 127.605(3) (1990) ("life-sustaining procedure"). Indiana also
has a statutory form called the "Life-Prolonging Procedures Declaration," which
specifically requests maximum treatment. IND. CODE § 16-8-11-12 (1992).
119. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3080.2(7) (West Supp. 1993) (defining terminal illness or injury as "an incurable and irreversible medical condition that, even with the use of medical treatment, will result in death of a
person").
120. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2984 (Michie Supp. 1992) (providing
section on living will form allowing individual to express desire to continue
medical procedures designed to give "comfort care or to alleviate pain").
121. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7194.5 (West Supp. 1993)

(enacted 1976).
122. ALA. CODE §§ 22-8A-1 to -10 (1990); ALAsKA STAT. §§ 18.12.010-. 100
(1991); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3201 to -3262 (Supp. 1992); ARK. CODE
ANN. §§ 20-17-201 to -217 (Michie 1991); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-

7194.5 (West Supp. 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-18-101 to -113 (1987 &
Supp. 1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 19a-570 to -575 (Supp. 1987); DEL. CODE

ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2501-2508 (1993); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2421 to -2430 (1989);
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 765.101-.401 (West Supp. 1993); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-32-1
to -12 (Michie 1991 & Supp. 1992); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 327D-1 to -27 (Supp.
1991); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4501 to -4509 (1985 & Supp. 1992); ILL. REV. STAT.

ch. 110 1/2, paras. 701-710 (1991); IND. CODE §§ 16-8-11-1 to -22 (1992); IOWA
CODE §§ 144A.1-.11 (1989 & Supp. 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-28,101 to 28,109 (1985); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 311.622-.644 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
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The inconsistencies among statutes have the potential for
creating reciprocity problems. An individual who moves between
states may find that portions of his living will are not valid in the
new jurisdiction. In fact, Oregon requires that a specific statutory
form be executed; no other living will is valid in that state. 123 By
contrast, a limited number of states recognize the mobility of our
society and make specific provisions for living wills executed in
other states. 124 Even without the problems resulting from variations among statutes and the mobility of our society, there are
two substantial problems with many of the living will statutes that
limit their value even when properly executed.
The first problem, which has gained recent public attention,
relates to whether artificial nutrition and hydration may be withdrawn from the permanently unconscious under a properly executed living will.125 Many living will statutes specifically prevent
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1299.58.1-.10 (West 1992); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, §§ 5-701 to -714 (West Supp. 1992); MD. HEALTH-GEN.
CODE ANN. §§ 5-601 to -614 (1990); MINN. STAT. §§ 145B.01-. 17 (Supp. 1993);
Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-101 to -121 (Supp. 1992); Mo. REV. STAT.
§§ 459.010-.055 (1992); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-9-101 to -206 (1991); NEB.
REV. STAT. §§ 20-401 to -416 (Supp. 1992); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 449.535-.690
(1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 137-H:1 to -H:16 (1990 & Supp. 1992); NJ.
STAT. ANN. §§ 26:2H-53 to -78 (West Supp. 1992); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7-1 to
-10 (Michie 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-320 to -322 (1990); N.D. CENT. CODE
§§ 23-06.4-01 to -14 (1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2133.01-15 (Anderson
Supp. 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 3101-3111 (West Supp. 1993); OR.
REV. STAT. §§ 127.605-.990 (1990); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 5401-5416 (Supp.
1993); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 23-4.1 1-1 to -13 (Supp. 1992); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 4477-10 to -160 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. §§ 34-12D-1
to -22 (Supp. 1992); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 32-11-101 to -112 (Supp. 1992); TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 672.001-.021 (West 1992); UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 75-2-1101 to -118 (1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5251-5262 (1987); VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-2981 to -2993 (Michie Supp. 1992); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 70.122.010-.905 (West 1993); W. VA. CODE §§ 16-30-1 to -13 (1991 & Supp.
1992); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 154.01-.15 (West 1989 & Supp. 1992); Wvo. STAT.

Supp. 1992);

§§ 35-22-101 to -109 (1988 & Supp. 1992).

123. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.610 (requiring that "directive shall be in the following form") (emphasis added).
124. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.112 (providing that "declaration executed in another state in compliance with the law of that state" is valid in Florida). The question of reciprocity has been left open in most states. A typical
statute allows a declaration to be in any form so long as it "substantially complies" with the statutory form. See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.626. The
problem with interstate enforceability in these jurisdictions may turn on the
question of proper execution, namely the number of witnesses and their
identity.
125. The discussion is focused on the issue of nutrition and hydration because it is the current unresolved topic. Twenty years ago, as physicians began
to perform organ transplants, the prevailing issue was when did death occur.
DAVID J. ROTHMAN, STRANGERS AT THE BEDSIDE 156 (1991). In the mid-1970s,
the issue was whether respirators should be disconnected. See, e.g., In re Quinlan
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the individual from making such a decision. The most common
method of preventing the withdrawal of artificial nutrition is
through the statutory definition of "life-sustaining procedures."
These statutes allow the withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures
but specifically exclude artificial nutrition and hydration from the
definition of life-sustaining procedures. 26 These statutes contrast sharply with more recent legislation providing living will
forms that allow the declarant to affirmatively request the withdrawal of nutrition and hydration. 127 Finally, there are those statutes that make no mention of the issue of nutrition and hydration.
These statutes often provide that "comfort care" cannot be with28
drawn, but they do not define the term.'
The second problem with many of these statutes is that they
apply only if the person is in a "terminal condition."' 129 A common statutory definition of a terminal condition is an "incurable
condition caused by disease, illness, or injury which, regardless of
the application of life-sustaining procedures, would produce
355 A.2d 647, 651 (N.J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). With advances in
medical technology, there are already new issues on the horizon. See, e.g.,
Michael E. Young, Court Bars Donating Doomed Baby's Organs, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 28,
1992, at Al (discussing court's refusal to allow organ transplants from
anencephalic infant because she did not satisfy criteria for brain death). At the
very least, the law must remain flexible to deal with advances in technology.
126. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 702(d) (precluding withdrawal of nutrition and hydration "if the withdrawal or withholding would result
in death solely from dehydration or starvation rather than from the existing terminal condition"); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 5-602(c)(1) (excluding "administration of food and water" from those procedures to be withheld); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-H:2(II) (excluding "sustenance" from definition of lifesustaining procedures); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 154.01(5)(b) (excluding "provision of
nutrition or hydration" from definition of life-sustaining procedure).
127. See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 18.12.010(c) (containing specific provision on
declaration form to allow individual to indicate whether or not he wants nutrition provided through gastric tube or intravenous mechanism). Some jurisdictions allow the withdrawal of nutrition by a back door process. The statutes
provide that artificial nutrition and hydration cannot be withdrawn unless there
is a specific affirmative statement to that effect included in the living will. See,
e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 3 1-32-3. Oklahoma has a separate statute which creates a
rebuttable presumption that all incompetent patients wish to receive artificial
nutrition and hydration. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 3080.1-3080.5. This presumption can be rebutted by a living will that includes a statement to the contrary or by clear and convincing evidence of the patient's intent. Id.
128. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-8A-3(3) (excluding from life-sustaining procedures "the performance of any medical procedure deemed necessary to provide
comfort or care or to alleviate pain"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.101(11) (stating
that "term 'life-prolonging procedure' does not include the administration of
medication or performance of medical procedure ... deemed necessary to provide comfort care or alleviate pain").
129. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 702(h) (limiting living will
statute's applicability to patients with "incurable and irreversible conditions").
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death." 130 Somestatutes also require that death be imminent.' 3 1
It is the person in a terminal condition, however, who least needs
the protection of a living will. Even if the person is suffering, by
definition, he will die within a short period of time. The people
most in need of a living will are people like Karen Ann Quinlan
and Nancy Cruzan who were not in a terminal condition; they
could and did live for many years in a state of permanent unconsciousness with the assistance of a respirator or artificial nutrition
and hydration. 3 2
Living wills are an incomplete answer when an incompetent
person is being kept alive by life-support systems. Most people
will never execute a living will. Even those who do may find their
living will inadequate if they move to, or even travel in, another
state. Finally, if the person is not in a "terminal" condition or if
the person is being kept alive by artificial nutrition, the document
may be valueless.
2.

Durable Powers of Attorney for Health Care

Thirty-two states and the District of Columbia have statutes
that specifically provide for the execution of a durable power of
attorney for health care.' 3 3 This document allows a principal to
130.

GA. CODE ANN.

§ 31-32-2(13) (emphasis added). But see, e.g.,

ALA.

§ 22-8A-3(6) (defining terminally ill patient as one "whose death is imminent or whose condition is hopeless unless he or she is artificially supported
through the use of life-sustaining procedures" (emphasis added)).
131. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 702(h).
132. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 266 & n.l
(1990) (observing that Cruzan had been in persistent vegetative state for over
seven years); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 653-54 (N.J.) (indicating that Quinlan
had been in persistent vegetative state for over one year), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
922 (1976); see also Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626,
630 (Mass. 1986) (noting that Brophy was in persistent vegetative state for two
years, but was "not terminally ill nor.., in danger of imminent death").
In addressing the problem of patients who are not facing imminent death
only because they are being fed artificially, a few states have recently broadened
their definition of terminal condition to include persistent vegetative states. See,
e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2982 (defining terminal condition as specifically including situations where person was in persistent vegetative state). Karen Ann
Quinlan and Nancy Cruzan would arguably have been within some of the
broader definitions of terminal because their deaths would have been imminent
without the use of the respirator and artificial feeding techniques. See Cruzan, 497
U.S. at 267-68; Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 655-56.
133. The following 32 states and the District of Columbia have durable
power of attorney statutes which were developed specifically for health care purposes: CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 2430-2445 (West Supp. 1993); D.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 21-2201 to -2213 (1989 & Supp. 1992); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 765.201-.205
(West Supp. 1993); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-36-1 to -13 (Michie 1991); IDAHO
CODE §§ 39-4505 to -4509 (Supp. 1992); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, paras.
CODE

804-1 to -12 (1991);

KAN. STAT. ANN.

§§ 58-625 to -632 (Supp. 1992); Ky.
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name an agent to make health care decisions if the principal becomes unable to communicate his desires. An agent is particularly valuable because a principal generally chooses a close
relative or friend whom he trusts. Consequently, the agent knows
the person's values and standards. This appointment is thus con34
sistent with the rationale behind the substituted judgment test.1
Generally, statutes creating the durable power of attorney allow the agent to make any medical decisions that the person himself could have made if he were competent. 135 As with living
wills, there are many variations in durable power of attorney statutes among the states.' 3 6 Most significantly, the statutes vary on
the issue of whether artificial nutrition and hydration can be withdrawn.' 7 The majority allow the withdrawal of nutrition and hySTAT. ANN. §§ 311.970-.986 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1992); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18-A, §§ 5-501 to -506 (West Supp. 1992); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
201D, §§ 1-17 (West Supp. 1993); MICH. COMP. LAws §§ 700.495-.496 (Supp.
1993); MINN. STAT. §§ 145B.01-.17 (Supp. 1993); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41151 to -183 (Supp. 1992); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 404.800-.870 (Supp. 1993); NEB.
REV. STAT. §§ 30-2401 to -3432 (Supp. 1992); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 449.800-.860
(1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 137-J:1 to -J:16 (Supp. 1992); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 26:2H-53 to -78 (West Supp. 1992); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw §§ 2980-2994
(McKinney Supp. 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 32A-15 to -26 (1991); N.D. CENT.
CODE §§ 23-06.5-01 to -18 (1991); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.505-.585 (1990); R.I.
GEN. LAws §§ 23-4.10-1 to -12 (1989 & Supp. 1992); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-5501 to -505 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. §§ 59-7-2.1 to
-2.8 (Supp. 1992); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 34-6-201 to -215 (1991); TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 135.001-.018 (West Supp. 1993); UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 75-2-1106 to -1118 (1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 3451-3467 (1989 &
Supp. 1992); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-2981 to -2993 (Michie Supp. 1992); W. VA.
CODE §§ 16-30A-1 to -20 (1991); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 155.01-.80 (West Supp.
1992); Wyo. STAT. §§ 3-5-201 to -213 (Supp. 1992).
134. At the same time, the power of appointment eliminates the problems
associated with the substituted judgment test by preventing the appointment of
a guardian who is unfamiliar with the individual's desires. For a discussion of
the substituted judgment test, see supra notes 31-50 and accompanying text.
135. For these statutory enactments, see supra note 133. Five states have
only a brief statute that allows any power of appointment to survive disability if
the power specifically so states. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-14-501 to -509 (1987);
HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 551D-1 to -7 (Supp. 1991); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN.
§§ 13-601 to -603 (1991); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 72-5-501 to -502 (1991); N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 45-5-501 to -502 (Michie 1989). These statutes do not mention
medical decisionmaking but presumably could be applied in that situation.
Four other states have statutes creating durable powers of appointment primarily for property management but that specifically allow for medical decisionmaking as well. ALASKA STAT. §§ 13.26.332-.356 (Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN.
STAT. §§ 1-42 to -56 (1985 & Supp. 1993); IND. CODE §§ 30-5-1-1 to -10-4
(Supp. 1992); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.94.010 (West Supp. 1993).
136. Some of these variations create problems similar to those that exist
under the living will statutes. For a discussion of the problems associated with
living will statutes, see supra notes 122-32 and accompanying text.
137. Connecticut does not allow the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and
hydration. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-54a. Three states make no reference to the
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dration. This creates an anomaly in certain states where the living
will statute specifically precludes the withdrawal of nutrition and
hydration but the durable power of attorney statute allows such
3 8
withdrawal. 1
Durable powers of attorney for health care are in some respects better than living wills because they are more flexible.
However, the most significant problems remain: they only benefit
those who execute them, problems arise when a person moves to
another state, and in a few states, artificial nutrition cannot be
withdrawn.
3.

Other Statutes

States have begun to recognize the deficiencies in living wills
and durable powers of attorney for health care. Sixteen states
and the District of Columbia now provide for family decisionmaking even in the absence of these two documents. 3 9 Generally,
issue of artificial nutrition. NEV. REV. STAT. § 449.830; N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 2306.5-02 to-03; TENN. CODE ANN. § 34-6-205. Limits on the right to withdraw
nutrition and hydration are included in two statutes. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 311.978(3)(c) (preventing withdrawal of nutrition unless burdens of continuing it outweigh benefits); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 155.20(4) (allowing withdrawal of
nutrition unless withdrawal will cause pain or reduce comfort).
138. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 702(d) (living will; preventing withdrawal of nutrition if death would result solely from dehydration or starvation rather than from existing terminal condition); id. para. 804-10 (durable
power; allowing withdrawal of nutrition unless benefits of treatment outweigh
burdens).
139. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3231 (Supp. 1992) (designating order of
priority for health care decisionmaking: person's spouse, adult children, parent,
domestic partner, sibling or close friend); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-214 (Michie
1991) (allowing health care decisionmaking by patient's guardian, parent,
spouse, adult child, adult sibling or adult heir); D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-2210
(1989) (allowing designated living adult relatives, spouses or religious superior
to make health care decisions); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.401 (West Supp. 1993)
(allowing designated adult guardian, spouse or relative to make medical decisions so long as physician agrees and two witnesses are present at time decision
made); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 851-25 (Supp. 1992) (allowing surrogate decisionmaking by patient's guardian, spouse, adult child, parent, adult sibling, adult grandchild or close friend); IND. CODE § 16-8-12-4 (1992) (giving
authorization to judicially appointed guardian, spouse, parent, adult child, adult
sibling or religious superior to consent for incapable party); IOWA CODE
§ 144A.7 (1989) (allowing patient's guardian or family members-spouse, adult
child, parent or adult sibling-to consult with physician and decide to withdraw
life-sustaining procedures); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1299.58.5-.6 (West 1992)
(allowing decision to be made by patient's spouse, adult child, parent, sibling or
other ascendants or descendants); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-707 (West
Supp. 1992) (giving authority to withdraw treatment to patient's spouse, adult
child, parent, adult sibling or other adult relative so long as attending physician
agrees); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-106 (1991) (giving authority to patient's
spouse, adult child, parent or other adult relative to withdraw treatment); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 24-7-8.1 (Michie 1991) (providing that if patient has not executed

HeinOnline -- 38 Vill. L. Rev. 130 1993

1993]

SURROGATE DECISIONMAKING

these statutes provide that if a person who is incapable of making
medical decisions has not named an agent to make health care
decisions, a family member may make such decisions on the person's behalf. Each statute includes a list of family members who
may consent, sometimes in order of priority. 4 0 Some statutes
give a court-appointed guardian priority in making medical decisions 41 and others only allow the guardian to make medical decisions if no family member is available. 4 2 Some extend to all
relatives, even distant ones, 4 3 others allow friends to make decidocument, physician can remove "maintenance medical treatment" if all family
members who can be contacted agree in good faith that patient would have foregone treatment); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322 (1990) (providing that "extraordinary means" to sustain life can be withdrawn by patient's guardian, spouse or
majority of relatives of first degree); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.635 (1990) (providing
that patient's spouse, guardian, adult child or parent can request that life-sustaining procedures be withdrawn if physicians agree); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-6630 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992) (allowing spouse, parent, adult child, adult sibling,
grandparents, adult grandchild or other relative to make health care decision for
patient unable to consent and allowing for judicial intervention if two persons of
equal priority disagree); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 672.009 (West
1992) (giving authority to make decision to withdraw life-sustaining procedures
to patient's spouse, majority of available adult children, parents or other relative); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1107 (1992) (allowing physician to consult with
patient's spouse, parent or adult children in deciding whether to withdraw lifesustaining procedures); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2986 (Michie Supp. 1992) (allowing patient's spouse, adult child, parent, sibling or other living relative to
make health care decisions).
One of these states, Louisiana, does not have a statute authorizing durable
powers of attorney for health care. Thus, in Louisiana, an individual is limited
to the statutorily named decisionmaker even if that is not the person he would
have chosen. This is particularly difficult for non-traditional couples where
there is strong disagreement with the individual's family. For a discussion of
litigation between an incompetent patient's parents and her lesbian partner, see
infra note 325.
Five additional states have general medical consent statutes. IDAHO CODE
§ 39-4303 (1985) (outlining generally who "may give consent to care for
others"); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-3 (Supp. 1992) (allowing any adult patient
and various other people, including spouses, emancipated minors and guardians
to consent to medical procedures); Mo. REV. STAT. § 431.061 (1992) (indicating
who can give consent to medical treatment and under what circumstances); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 23-12-13 (1991) (setting forth those persons who can make health
care decisions for incapacitated patients); W. VA. CODE § 16-5B-8a (Supp. 1992)
(listing those persons who can consent for incapacitated patient in long-term
care facility). While these statutes could be construed expansively to allow the
family members to withdraw or withhold medical treatment, they were designed
to give family members the power to approve the medical treatment recommended by the attending physician.
140. For a description of these statutory lists, see supra note 139.
141. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-214; D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-2210;
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.401; S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-66-30.
142. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 144A.7; MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-106.
143. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.5; VA. CODE ANN. § 54.12986.
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sions if no family member is available, 14 4 and two allow a religious
superior to make the decision for a member of a religious
order. 145
As is true of both living wills and durable powers of attorney,
there are many variations among the statutes. The two most
troublesome variations center around the issue of consensus. Illinois and Utah require that at least one physician agree with the
named family member before life-sustaining treatment can be terminated. 14 6 Consequently, the family can make the decision only
if the medical establishment approves.
The other variation is that some states require unanimity or
majority agreement among family members who are in the same
class of priority, e.g. the person's adult children. 4 7 If there are a
substantial number of class members, the objection of one could
frustrate the intent of the person. One particularly egregious example is New Mexico which requires the agreement of the spouse
and adult children, thus preventing the spouse from acting
alone. 148 This may be a significant barrier when the spouse is
from a second marriage and the children are from a first
marriage.
4.

The Patient Self-Determination Act

To date the most significant federal legislative response in
the area of health care decisionmaking is the Patient Self-Determination Act (PSDA).' 4 9 The PSDA applies to health care provid144. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3231; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.401.
145. D.C, CODE ANN. § 21-2210(5A) (allowing religious superior to make
health care decisions for patient if patient is member of religious order); IND.
CODE § 16-8-12-4(3) (same; requiring, however, that individual does not have
guardian or guardian does not act before authority can be given to religious
superior).
146. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 851-20(c) (requiring certification by

two physicians); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1107 (requiring written concurrence of
two physicians).
147. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.5A(l)(g) (requiring that all members of defined class consent to withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedure); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322(b)(iii) (requiring majority of relatives of first
degree to agree when patient has no spouse or guardian); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.12986 (requiring agreement of majority of defined class of family members).
148. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7-8.1.
149. The PSDA was enacted as part of the Budget Act of 1990 and is not a
distinct statutory provision, but rather is scattered throughout various sections
of the United States Code. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990,
Requirements for Advance Directives, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 4751, 104 Stat.
1388, 1388-204 (1991) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (Supp. III
1991)). The PSDA became effective December 1, 1991.
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ers including hospitals, nursing homes and other inpatient and
outpatient care providers receiving federal funding under the
Medicaid or Medicare programs. 150 Under the PSDA, these
health care providers must: (1) give written information to all
adult patients explaining their rights under state law to make
medical care decisions; (2) establish policies and procedures
within the health care facility to implement patients' advance directives 1 5 1 and provide all patients with information about such
policies; (3) ask each patient if they have executed such an advance directive; (4) develop mechanisms to ensure compliance
with state law related to medical care decisionmaking; and (5) educate hospital staff members about advance directives. 15 2
The reaction of health care providers to the legislation has
been positive.' 5 3 The federal act also stimulated increased state
legislative activity in the area of living will and durable power of
attorney legislation. 54 A common criticism of the PSDA, however, is that the time of admission to a health care facility is not
the ideal time for a person to be informed of his rights regarding
withdrawal of medical treatment. 15 5 Nonetheless, the PSDA is
generally considered an appropriate step towards encouraging
the return of decisionmaking power to individuals. 5 6
150. See Schlesinger & Scheiner, supra note 2, at 144.
151. An advance directive under the PSDA is defined as "a written instruction, such as a living will or durable power of attorney for health care, recognized under a state statute or by the courts of the state as relating to health care
when the individual giving the instruction becomes incapacitated." Id. at 145.
152. Id. at 144-45.
153. See Bruce Weber, Positive Reaction Greets 'Living Will' Law, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 2, 1991, at B3 (stating that "reaction among patients and staff members at
hospitals in the metropolitan region [to the PSDA] was largely one of relief").
154. See, e.g., Erich H. Loewy, Advance Directives and Surrogate Laws; Ethical
Instruments or Moral Cop-Out?, 152 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1973, 1973 (1992)
(noting that PSDA "spawned a rash of legislation in the several states"). Moreover, Loewy asserts that state legislation is not only supporting the PSDA but is
also expanding to protect patients from being at the mercy of "crass medical or
crass legal paternalism." Id.
155. See, e.g., id. at 1974-75 (expressing concern that PSDA and advance
directive laws are not enough; that in order for patients to make informed
choices physicians must spend time discussing options and educating patients);
Kevin M. McIntyre, Shepherding the Patient's Right to Self-Determination; The Physician's Dawning Role, 152 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 259, 259 (1992) (recognizing
that although providing such information at time of admission to hospital may
be most practical, it is still far from ideal method of disseminating such information to public); see also Joanna S. Abramson, Guardianship Petitions 'Swamp' State
Courts, MICH. LAW. WKLY., Nov. 25, 1991, at 1 (noting that in response to PSDA,
Michigan nursing homes refused to accept new incompetent patients unless they
had executed durable power of attorney or had guardian).
156. McIntyre, supra note 155, at 259 (asserting that PSDA "will very likely
increase the use [of advance directives] by bringing a national face to [them]").
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The PSDA and the various state statutes described above are
a major step toward removing from limbo those individuals who
have not executed a durable power of attorney or a living will;
but, current statutes are an incomplete answer. Physicians should
not be allowed to interfere in family medical decisions and impose their own values. Moreover, the requirement of unanimity
has the effect of creating a presumption against termination of
treatment. This imposition of values and the current presumption against termination of treatment are the focus of the following part.
III.

PROBLEMS INHERENT IN JUDICIAL INVOLVEMENT IN
DECISIONMAKING

Judicial involvement in medical decisionmaking is a relatively
recent phenomenon. 15 7 Until the late 1950s and early 1960s,
medical decisionmaking was exercised almost exclusively by the
patient's personal physician. 15 8 Not only were judges and hospital ethics committees not part of the decisionmaking process, but
59
frequently, not even the patient and his family were consulted.
By the mid-1970s, however, the entire decisionmaking process
had changed. Physicians, patients, family members, hospital eth60
ics committees and the judiciary were all involved.'
Several events were critical in causing these changes. First,
public concern was aroused about abuses in human experimentation.' 6' In the notorious Tuskegee study, men with syphilis were
left untreated in order to study the effects of the disease. 6 2 Such
abuses led to increasing public distrust in allowing physicians to
exercise full control in health care decisionmaking. The second
157. ROTHMAN, supra note 125, at 1 (noting that "[wiell into the post-World
War II period, decisions at the bedside were the almost exclusive concern of the
individual physician").
158. Id.
159. Id. at 2. For example, as recently as the early 1960s, almost 90% of
physicians stated that it was their usual policy not to inform a patient of a cancer
diagnosis. Id. at 147.
160. Id. at 2.
161. Id. at 3. For a comprehensive discussion of human experimentation
and its exploitation, see Henry K. Beecher, Ethics and Clinical Research, 274 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1354 (1966) (detailing abuses of human subjects by medical researchers). See also ROTHMAN, supra note 125, at 70-100 (discussing process used
by Beecher to document and expose exploitation in human experimentation).
162. ROTHMAN, supra note 125, at 183. Rothman discusses how for over 30
years until the early 1970s, investigators from the United States Public Health
Service had studied, but not treated, black men suffering from secondary
syphilis in rural Alabama. Id.
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lightning rod was the 1969 death of a Down's syndrome baby
born with a digestive abnormality. 6 3 The child died fifteen days
after birth because surgery was not performed.' 64 At the same
time, the abortion issue was becoming heated, culminating with
the decision in Roe v. Wade.' 65 Thus, public distrust expanded to
include parents who were believed to be colluding with the
physicians.
The final event which galvanized this area was the case of
Karen Ann Quinlan. 16 6 Karen entered a persistent vegetative
state in 1975 from an unknown cause and required mechanical
ventilation to sustain her respiratory function.' 6 7 Karen's father
requested the removal of the respirator, but the doctors refused.' 68 Because the medical profession would not comply with
his request, Joseph Quinlan turned to the legal profession.' 69
Thus began the involvement of the judiciary in medical
decisionmaking.
In general, society has benefitted from the public attention to
medical decisionmaking. People have been forced to grapple
with major medical, ethical and religious issues. Families are now
involved in decisions affecting their lives rather than leaving these
personal decisions to the unsupervised control of individual physicians.' 70 The pendulum, however, has swung past the middle to
the opposite extreme. The government, through the courts, has
163. Id. at 191.
164. Id. The infant's intestinal blockage could have been repaired through
surgical intervention but the parents refused to consent. Id.

165. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
166. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d. 647 (N.J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
167. Id. at 654.
168. Id. at 656-57.
169. The New Jersey Supreme Court granted Joseph Quinlan the authority
to withdraw Karen's life support system by appointing him as her guardian. Id.
at 672.

170. ROTHMAN, supra note 125, at 190-91, 210-12. See generally ROBERT STINSON & PEGGY STINSON, THE LONG DYING OF BABY ANDREW (1983). This book
was written by parents whose child was born prematurely, suffering from serious
birth defects. It discusses the parents' frustration when their child was transferred to a teaching hospital and given treatment against their wishes. Medical
ethicist David Rothman suggests that the doctors' initial treatment really was not
that far off the mark. ROTHMAN, supra note 125, at 218. However, there should
have been a termination of treatment later on. Unfortunately, the perspective of
doctors in a neonatal unit-that with maximum treatment, children have a
chance to survive-prevented the termination of treatment in Andrew's case.
Rothman asserts that the fact "[tihat Andrew lost does not support the case for
parents' rights, any more than does the fact that other infants have won buttress
the case for doctors." Id. at 219.
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merely replaced the physicians as the decisionmaker.' 7 '
Before the Quinlan case, physicians, outside of the glare of

the public spotlight, discontinued treatment "when they believed
that a patient's death was imminent and irreversible," and hospitals allowed the physicians to make those decisions without the
interference of regulations and committees. 172 Even today, it is
acknowledged that many physicians continue to quietly turn off
machines when further treatment is futile.' 7 3 Not all hospitals,
however, will allow this informal decisionmaking. Moreover,
some physicians are unwilling to take this responsibility. 74 The
171. ROTHMAN, supra note 125, at 228. The problem of the government as
the decisionmaker is particularly acute in the area of neonatal care. In 1984, the
Reagan Administration promulgated regulations which require the treatment of
infants under virtually all circumstances without regard to the severity of their
disabilities or prognosis for life. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.55 (1992). In some instances, the result may be essentially human experimentation. PAUL RAMSEY,
ETHICS AT THE EDGES OF LIFE 208-10 (1978) (recognizing that infants may be
treated not because they are expected to survive but rather to experiment with
new medical procedures).
172. ROTHMAN, supra note 125, at 160.
173. Id. at 228; see also In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 75 (N.Y.) (Jones, J.,
dissenting in part), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981). In Storar, Justice Jones
noted that for many years physicians and family members had turned off the life
support systems of incurably ill patients without the intervention of the legal
system. Id. (Jones, J., dissenting in part). In a 1975 opinion piece in the New
York Times, Washington, D.C. physician Michael Halberstam "expressed surprise
that the [Quinlan] case 'is in court at all. Each day, hundreds, perhaps thousands,
of similar dilemmas present themselves ....
The decisions are difficult, often
agonizing, but they are reached in hospital corridors and in waiting rooms, not
courts.' " ROTHMAN, supra note 125, at 228 (quoting Michael Halberstam, Other
Karen Quinlan Cases Never Reach Court, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1975 § 4, at 9).
174. The most commonly expressed reason for a physician's hesitation in
terminating life support is the fear of criminal liability or malpractice suits. Only
one case involved criminal charges against the physicians, however, and that indictment was dismissed on the pleadings. Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal.
Rptr. 484, 486 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). There are no reported cases involving malpractice and such cases are not likely. Only immediate family members would
have standing to sue, and they will not sue if the doctors have terminated treatment in accordance with their wishes.
Despite the dearth of prosecutions of physicians for removing a respirator
from one whose death is imminent and unavoidable, there still exists a pervasive, even hysterical, fear of liability in the medical world. See John J. Paris &
Richard A. McCormick, Living-Will Legislation, Reconsidered, AM., Sept. 5, 1981, at
86, 86. This hysteria is not completely unfounded. For example, litigation was
required in the Eichner case because of the Nassau County District Attorney's
insistence on the continued respiratory treatment of Brother Fox. See In re
Eichner, 420 N.E.2d 64, 67-68 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981). Furthermore, in 1977, the Attorney General of the State of Washington issued an opinion on the subject of withdrawal of life support from a dying patient which stated
that "[u]nder the present law, an attempt to bring about death by the removal of
a life sustaining mechanism would constitute homicide, first degree." Paris &
McCormick, supra, at 88.
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result is that a patient's rights depend on the personal views of his
17 5
physician and the policies of the hospital he has selected.
These historical changes have had an enormous impact on
individual lives and on medical decisionmaking. The following
sections focus on the impact of judicial intervention on family
decisionmaking. Specifically, these sections focus on the value
system that is inherent in any medical decisionmaking and the impossibility of discovering any objective approach to the question
of whether to terminate life-sustaining medical treatment.
A. Judges Should Not Make PersonalMedical Decisions
The issue of termination of medical treatment does not belong in court. Judges have no special expertise that allows them
to make the decision to terminate medical treatment. Many
courts recognize that decisions made by courts concerning withdrawal of medical treatment are not inherently better than deci76
sions made by doctors or families.'
Justice Stevens, recognizing the difficulty of deciding these
essentially private questions, stated in Cruzan: "It is not within
the province of secular government to circumscribe the liberties
of the people by regulations designed wholly for the purpose of
establishing a sectarian definition of life."' 177 Justice Jones stated
in his dissent in Storar that "we approach, and even may be
175. In a study of intensive care units (ICU) at two teaching hospitals, there
was a dramatic difference in the percentage of patients for whom treatment was
limited. ZUSSMAN, supra note 13, at 131. At one hospital, physicians limited
treatment for approximately one-third of the patients while at the other hospital,
treatment was limited for fewer than one-sixth of the patients. Id. The difference is particularly striking because both hospitals used the same standard in
limiting treatment: the patient had to be terminal. Id. at 132. The difference in
treatment was the result of the subjective application of the standard.
A patient's rights may also be affected by who is paying for the medical care,
particularly when the patient is receiving public assistance. Nancy Cruzan and
Elizabeth Bouvia were in public hospitals; their care was being paid with public
funds. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 411 n.2 (Mo. 1988) (en banc), aff'd
sub nom. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); Bouvia v.
Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 299-300 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). The Attorney
General of the State of Missouri prosecuted the appeal in Cruzan and county
attorneys opposed the petition in Bouvia. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 410; Bouvia, 225
Cal. Rptr. at 298.
176. See, e.g., In re Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d 32, 42 (Ind. 1991); see also In re
Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 451 (N.J. 1987). InJobes, the court asserted: "Courts are
not the proper place to resolve the agonizing personal problems that underlie
these cases. Our legal system cannot replace the more intimate struggle that
must be borne by the patient, those caring for the patient and those who care
about the patient." Id.
177. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 350 (1990)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
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thought by some to trespass on, the domain of Providence. Few
areas of judicial activity present such awesome questions or demand greater judicial wisdom and restraint."'178 Our adversary
system is designed to settle disputes between parties with conflicting claims. For example, courts determine whether contracts are
valid or whether individuals are negligent. Courts were not
designed to make personal family decisions such as whether a
child should attend a parochial school or whether a person should
be treated by a chiropractor. Except in the area of divorce, when
two people who are incapable of agreeing have equal right to decide such issues, a court is not an appropriate forum. These questions are infused with moral, ethical and theological elements.
Courts, for good reason, have stayed out of this area in the past.
As courts began to enter the arena of medical care decisionmaking they attempted to be objective, trying to make the best
decision. The problem is that there is no one best decision. In
their attempts to decide these questions, judges have made many
assumptions that have often had the effect of preordaining the
outcome. These assumptions will be examined in the following
section.
B.

FictionalAssumptions UnderlyingJudicial Decisions

There are two fundamental problems with Cruzan and most
of the decisions involving termination of life-sustaining treatment. The first problem is that medical technology has
progressed beyond our knowledge of life and death. For generations, a bright line divided life and death. When a person
stopped breathing or his heart stopped functioning, he was dead.
The development of respirators, heart-lung machines, and more
recently, artificial feeding techniques has blurred this line and destroyed the medical and societal consensus as to when a person
dies.
The second problem is societal distrust of family decision178. In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 75 (N.Y.) (Jones, J., dissenting in part),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981). Justice Jones further stated:
[T]he judicial system is unsuited and ill-equipped to solve [that] which
should not usually be made the subject of judicial attention ....
The
methodology and the techniques for our classic adversary system are
not best suited to the resolution of the issues presented. The courts
can claim no particular competence to reach the difficult ultimate decision, depending as it necessarily must not only on medical data, but on
theological tenets and perceptions of human values which defy classification and calibration.

Id. (Jones, J., dissenting in part).
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making. In recent years, the government has increasingly intervened in private lives when children are involved. The goal of
protecting children from abuse certainly is desirable. Even from
the outset, however, problems arose because children from poor
households have always been more likely to be characterized as
abused and to be placed in foster homes than children from mid79
dle class families.'
This concern for abused children evolved into a tendency of
courts to second-guess decisions that in the past were private.
For example, during the past ten years, courts have frequently
ordered caesarean sections for women who have refused to consent to the procedure. 8 0 A particularly tragic case involved Angela Carder. 18 ' Angela Carder suffered from cancer, but was in
remission when she became pregnant in 1987. Twenty-five weeks
into the pregnancy her doctor discovered that the cancer had
spread. Angela Carder, her husband, her parents and one of her
doctors decided against an emergency caesarean, but George
Washington University Hospital petitioned the Superior Court to
seek "a judicial determination of its legal obligations."'' 8 2 The
trial judge ordered a caesarean section and the court of appeals
refused to issue a stay.' 8 3 The infant died two hours after birth.
18 4
Angela Carder died two days later.
Society justifies interference with family decisionmaking on
the basis that children must be protected from abuse or neglect or
under the theory that family members have a conflict of interest
because the death of the loved one will relieve them of their emo179. See generally, Ira Glasser, Prisonersof Benevolence: Power Versus Liberty in the
Welfare State, in WILLARD GAYLIN ET AL., DOING GOOD: THE LIMITS OF BENEVOLENCE 97, 145-68 (1981) (discussing problems associated with state-financed social programs that may harm rather than help).
180. See generally Nancy K. Rhoden, The Judge in the Delivery Room: The Emergence of Court-OrderedCesareans, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1951, 1952 (1986) (weighing woman's right to refuse caesarean delivery against state's interest in preserving
life).
181. Linda Greenhouse, Wide Appeal Filed on Forced Caesarean Delivery, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 25, 1987, at A15; see also Marney Rich, A Question of Rights: Birth and
Death Decisions Put Woman In Middle of Legal Conflict, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 18, 1988, at
Cl.
182. Greenhouse, supra note 181, at A15.
183. See In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1241 (D.C. 1990). The family argued to
the trial judge that a caesarean section would inflict unjustified pain upon Ms.
Carder in her last moments of life because the child might be born with birth
defects and might not survive. Greenhouse, supra note 181, at A15. Experts for
the hospital testified, however, that the 26-week-old fetus had a 50-60%
probability of survival and a less than 20% chance of substantial impairment if
delivered at that point. In reA.C., 573 A.2d at 1239.
184. In reA.C., 573 A.2d at 1241.
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tional and/or financial burdens. Instead, society concludes, the
omniscient and impartial outsider should make the decision. This
conclusion is fundamentally flawed. Only God is omniscient and
there is no absolute truth that impartial judges can apply. There
are only individual preferences based in individual morality.
In the following sections, the most frequently expressed assumptions will be examined. Judges use these rationales as the
underpinnings for decisions in which they refuse to allow the termination of medical treatment in the absence of a written declaration or other clear and convincing evidence of the person's desire
to terminate life-sustaining treatment.
1. It Is Better to Err in Favor of Preserving Life
The first assumption is that it is better for judges to err in
favor of preserving life.1 8 5 Implicit in this statement is the conclusion that permanent unconsciousness 8 6 is "life." For example,
in In re Barry, an infant had only brain stem activity; yet, the state's
attorney tried to prevent the termination of treatment in order to
protect the infant's "life."' 8 7 Additionally, in In re Colyer, although the court noted that there was no likelihood that Bertha
Colyer would ever again have a meaningful existence, two justices
dissented from the majority opinion allowing termination of
treatment. 88 A few courts have modified this assumption by
drawing a distinction between "biological life" 1 89 and "cognitive
or sapient life."' 90
If "biological life" is the accepted standard, the question is:
why is it best to err in favor of preserving life? Why not err in
185. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 273 (1990).
186. "Permanent unconsciousness" is a general term that includes many
subgroups of "irremediable unawareness." SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT TO DIE,
HANDBOOK OF LIVING WILL LAWS 11 (1987) [hereinafter LIVING WILL LAWS].
Two of these subgroups are irreversible coma and persistent vegetative state.
Id. An irreversible coma is a "condition in which the patient appears permanently asleep." Id. Persistent vegetative state is a condition in which a patient
appears to have cycles of sleeping and wakefulness. Id. These terms are frequently, and improperly, used interchangeably.
187. In re Barry, 445 So. 2d 365, 368 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
188. In re Colyer, 660 P.2d 738, 743 (Wash. 1983) (en banc) (suffering from
anoxic brain damage, patient was unable to breathe on her own and was in persistent vegetative state).
189. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 659 (N.J.) (distinguishing "human life"
from "biological life in a merely vegetative state"), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922
(1976); see also In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1248 (N.J. 1985) (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (characterizing biological life as "life at its
most rudimentary level").
190. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 663; Colyer, 660 P.2d at 751.
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favor of relieving suffering? Why not err in favor of allowing individuals to die quickly and easily of natural causes? Are we sustaining life or prolonging death? 19 1 There are approximately
10,000 people who are permanently unconscious in hospitals and
nursing homes in this country. 19 2 No legislators have debated the
issue of whether these individuals are "alive." The populace has
not expressed a preference for keeping the permanently unconscious "alive" indefinitely. 19 3 The statement that it is best to err
in favor of preserving life is not a universal truth. It is an assumption that has allowed a handful of state court judges to decide
whether comatose patients will be able to die naturally or will be
kept "alive" with respirators and feeding tubes.
The corollary to this assumption is that withdrawal of nutrition is the equivalent of starving the person to death. 194 The assumption here is that provision of artificial nutrition is the same
as feeding a conscious person. A more apt analogy is the withdrawal of a respirator. Even though a person can no longer
breathe after disconnection of a respirator, removal of the respirator is not the same as suffocating a conscious individual. Similarly, removing the feeding tube from a permanently unconscious
person is very different from depriving a conscious individual of
food.
Whether a court's rationale is that it will not allow the person
to starve to death or that it is best to err in favor of life, the question remains the same: does a permanently unconscious person
have a life to preserve? That question can only be answered by
each person's family based on their own moral beliefs.
2.

The State Has an Interest in PreservingLife
The second assumption is that there is a legitimate state in-

191. The longest record for survival with nutrition via a feeding tube is 37
years. Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 637 (Mass.
1986).
192. Opinion of Judicial Council of American Medical Association (March,
1986) (statement of Dr. Nancy W. Dickey), in LIVING WILL LAwS, supra note 186,
at 11. Moreover, this number can be expected to increase significantly in the
future. Ronald E. Cranford, The Persistent Vegetative State. The Medical Reality (Getting the Facts Straight), HASTINGS CENTER REP., Feb.-Mar. 1988, at 31.
193. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 320 n.17
(1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Nancy K. Rhoden, Litigating Life and
Death, 102 HARV. L. REV. 373, 433-34 (1988)).
194. ILL. 87TH GEN. ASSEMBLY H.R. TRANSCRIPTION DEBATE 1-2 (May 24,
1991) (statement of Rep. McCracken).
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terest in preserving life.19 5 This is axiomatic. The state's interest
is generally subdivided into four factors: (1) the preservation of
life, (2) the protection of the interests of innocent third parties,
(3) the prevention of suicide and (4) the maintenance of the ethical integrity of the medical profession.' 9 6 On this basis, courts
consistently hold that the right to refuse medical treatment is not
absolute. 9 7 Courts balance these four factors against the right of
an individual to refuse medical treatment. 9 8 When a person is
competent, these state interests are rarely used to override the
competent person's decision.' 9 9 When the person is not competent, however, these factors are used as a presumption against termination of medical treatment.
The first factor, the state's interest in preserving life, embraces "two separate but related concerns: an interest in preserving the life of a particular person, and an interest in preserving
the sanctity of all life."2 0 0 While the state's interest in preserving
life is significant, standing alone it usually will not prevent a competent person from declining treatment. 20 ' The state's interest is
indirect and abstract and therefore generally must yield to the
20 2
competent person's more personal interest in his own life.
This factor becomes more complex when the person is not competent. The state's interest, however, should still weaken when
treatment only prolongs the life of an individual suffering from an
20 3
incurable condition.
There is a fundamental problem with the assumption that the
195. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280 (stating that there is "no gainsaying" state's
interest in protecting and preserving life).
196. See Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d
417, 425 (Mass. 1977); see also In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1223 (N.J. 1985).
197. See, e.g., Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1223 (noting that "[iln some cases, [the
right to refuse] may yield to countervailing societal interests in sustaining the
person's life").
198. See, e.g., In re Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 298-99 (Ill. 1989) (using
number of considerations including four state interests in determining right of
guardian to withdraw nutrition and hydration from incompetent patient with terminal condition).
199. See Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1225 (concluding that individual's right to selfdetermination will generally outweigh any contrary state interest, even though
enforcing person's right to terminate treatment may result in death).
200. Id. at 1223; see also Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 683 (Ariz.
1987) (en banc).
201. Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1223 (observing that "the life that the state is seeking to protect in such a situation is the life of the same person who has competently decided to forego the medical intervention").
202. Id.
203. In re Colyer, 660 P.2d 738, 743 (Wash. 1983) (en banc) (indicating that
although state's interest in preserving life should prevail in cases requiring life
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state has an interest in preserving life. Although the state should
protect an individual from the loss of his life by the act of another
as in the case of homicide, the state has no interest in interfering
with an individual's decision about his own life. As Justice Brennan noted in his dissent in Cruzan: "[T]he State has no legitimate
general interest in someone's life, completely abstracted from the
interest of the person living that life, that could outweigh the person's choice to avoid medical treatment. '20 4 This is true whether
or not the individual is competent.
The second factor, protection of the interests of innocent
third parties, is the basis on which courts occasionally order treatment of even competent persons. When the person's decision
could adversely affect the health, safety or welfare of third parties,
the person's right to refuse continued treatment must give way to
the protection of those third parties. 20 5 A typical example is
when the person has dependent children. 20 6 The interests of
third parties may be relevant in the situation where a blood transfusion will save a person's life and allow him to return to a meaningful relationship with his children. No third party, however,
benefits by maintaining the pulse and respiration of a person who
is permanently unconscious or is in a terminal condition.
The third factor, the prevention of suicide, is really a subset
of the state's general interest in preserving life. 20 7 The basis for
the state interest in preventing suicide is the prevention of "irrational self-destruction." 20 8 When a person refuses medical treatment, the disease is simply allowed to take its natural course. The
death which occurs is a result of the underlying disease and is not
that of a self-inflicted injury. 20 9 Suicide is really a question of insaving treatment for nonconsenting individuals, it should weaken when person
is suffering from incurable disease or condition).
204. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 313 (1990)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
205. Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1225.
206. See, e.g., In re President of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000,
1008 (D.C. Cir.) (requiring blood transfusion for Jehovah's Witness with young
children on basis that parent cannot abandon children), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978
(1964); see also Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905) (requiring vaccination when public health was at risk).
207. Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1224 (questioning whether prevention of suicide is
state interest worthy of consideration independent of state's general interest in
preserving life).
208. Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d
417, 426 n.ll (Mass. 1977).
209. Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1224; see also In re Minor, 434 N.E.2d 601, 609
(Mass. 1982) (noting that there was no request to stop medical treatment for
infant's underlying heart defect, only request for "no code" status).
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tent; it requires an intent to die 210 not just an unwillingness to
continue the fight to live.2 1' Thus, the state's interest in preventing suicide is not relevant in cases involving the withdrawal of
medical treatment.
The fourth factor, maintenance of the integrity of the medical
profession, is perhaps the least important interest. Even the
American Medical Association recognizes that medical treatment
need not be provided in every situation. 2 12 This factor is obviously irrelevant if the physician does not object.2 13 Even the physician's objection, however, should not be the final answer on this
question. 214 The person should not give up his right to self-determination when he chooses a physician. When a person rejects
his doctor's advice, he is accepting responsibility for his medical
210. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTr, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 7.8, at 649
(2d ed. 1986); see also Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 306 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1986) (stating that patient's desire "to allow nature to take its course is not
equivalent to an election to commit suicide with real parties aiding and
abetting").
211. In Cruzan, the focus of Justice Scalia's concurrence is that refusal of
medical treatment is suicide. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S.
261, 292 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia would prevent a person
from refusing medical treatment no matter how painful or oppressive the illness
or how brief the extension of life if the result of the refusal would be acceleration of death. Such a radical position would give carte blanche to the medical
profession to make all decisions on patient treatment without interference by the
patient.
Noting that state statutes, not the Constitution, prohibit suicide, Justice
Scalia argues that Justice Brennan's and Justice Stevens' dissents advocate allowing suicide. Id. at 299-300 (Scalia, J., concurring). This characterization,
however, stretches their language to an unintended extreme and twists the obvious intent of Justice Brennan and Justice Stevens, which is to protect the patient's liberty interest in choosing to accept or reject particular medical
treatments.
Justice Scalia has oversimplified the problem to two choices: the acceptance
of all medical treatment no matter how small the benefit or the refusal of all
treatment no matter how significant the benefit. The result of Justice Scalia's
opinion would be to replace decisionmaking by the individual with decisionmaking by the medical establishment.
212. See AMA COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, WITHHOLDING OR
WITHDRAWING LIFE PROLONGING MEDICAL TREATMENT (Mar. 15, 1986), quoted in
Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 684 (Ariz. 1987) (en banc); see also
Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 426 (observing that "[p]revailing medical ethical practice does not, without exception, demand that all efforts toward life prolongation be made in all circumstances"); Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1224 (stating that
"[mledical ethics do not require medical intervention in disease at all costs").
213. Rasmussen, 741 P.2d at 684; see also Brophy v. New England Sinai
Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 638 (Mass. 1986) (concluding that integrity of medical profession is not violated if hospital does not take part in termination of
patient's medical treatment).
214. For a discussion of the right of conscience, see infra notes 341-46 and
accompanying text.
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treatment decisions. 2 15 The person's right to informed consent
would have no meaning if it must always give way when the person's decision conflicts with the advice of his doctor or even the
21 6
conclusions of the medical profession as a whole.
3.

Most People Want to Be Kept "Alive" by Machines

The third assumption is that most people would prefer to be
kept alive with mechanical devices. This assumption is implicit in
virtually all decisions involving refusal of medical treatment.
Courts begin with the presumption that the person wants treatment. The petitioner must then prove that the person does not
want to continue treatment. The presumption, however, is erroneous. Most people would rather die than be kept alive on machines. In 1986, the Gallup organization surveyed approximately
one thousand adults. 2 17 These adults were asked whether they
would want life support systems disconnected if they were in an
irreversible coma. 2 18 Seventy percent were "very willing" to have
their own life support system disconnected in that circumstance.2 1 9 The number increased to a dramatic eighty-two percent when the category "somewhat willing" was added. 220
This
public opinion poll was confirmed by a more sophisticated empirical study aimed at determining patient preferences. 2 2 1 Patients
with some current health problems were asked whether they
wished to receive cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) or CPR
and a ventilator if they suffered cardiac arrest in each of three
situations: after suffering a stroke, while suffering from chronic
lung disease or in their current condition. 2 22 CPR and a ventilator were only requested by fourteen percent of the participants in
the case of stroke, twenty-one percent in the case of chronic lung
22 3
disease, and twenty-three percent in the case of current health.
The request for CPR alone was significantly higher for chronic
lung disease (sixty-one percent) and current health (seventy-five
215. Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1225.
216. Id. For a discussion of the informed consent doctrine, see supra notes
12-15 and accompanying text.
217. Steiber, supra note 5, at 72.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Uhlmann et al., supra note 42, at M 115.
222. Id.
223. Id. at M 118 tbl. 2. The percentages of those requesting designated
treatment included those persons responding "definitely yes" and "probably
yes." Id.
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percent), but not for stroke (twenty-one percent). 2 24 The dramatic increase in the number requesting only CPR in comparison
to CPR and a ventilator evidences a desire for treatment if a person can live a somewhat normal life but a rejection of long term
total incapacitation in a hospital or nursing facility.
There appears to be a very clear consensus that people do
not want to be kept alive when life means unconsciousness or
maintenance on machines. In addition, people apparently do not
want treatment if no real benefit will result. It is time for courts to
change the presumption to one reflecting the public's desire not
to be kept "alive" by machines.
4.

There Is No Harm in Postponing the Decision

Perhaps the most insidious assumption is that there is no
harm in delaying a decision to terminate medical treatment. The
Supreme Court adopted the similar view that it was better to err
on the side of caution in terminating medical treatment because a
mistake in that direction could later be corrected while a decision
to terminate treatment could never be reversed. 2 2 5 While the irreversibility of the decision to terminate treatment is obvious, the
Court showed a surprising lack of appreciation for the continued
suffering and degradation resulting from a decision not to terminate treatment.2 26 Justice Brennan recognized this harm in his
dissent in Cruzan. He explained:
An erroneous decision not to terminate life support,
however, robs a patient of the very qualities protected by
the right to avoid unwanted medical treatment. His own
degraded existence is perpetuated; his family's suffering
is protracted; the memory he leaves behind becomes
more and more distorted.
Even a later decision to grant him his wish cannot
227
undo the intervening harm.
The risk of error is often the basis of a court's refusal to dis224. Id.
225. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 283 (1990).
226. Some courts have recognized the danger inherent in a decision either
to terminate or to continue treatment. See, e.g., In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209,
1220 (N.J. 1985) (stating that either way, mistaken decision would be
disastrous).
227. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 320 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also id. at 252-53
(Stevens,J., dissenting) (discussing harm in ignoring Nancy Cruzan's wishes and
prolonging her death).
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continue medical treatment.2 28 The risk of error, however, is inherent in the entire legal system. There are no certainties in the
law. Damages are imposed in most civil cases based on a mere
preponderance of the evidence standard. Even in the criminal
law, the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt leaves room for
error. A person can even be executed without absolute certainty.
In no other area does risk of error freeze the courts into inaction.
Thus, the mere chance that a decision may be erroneous should
not be the basis to continue treatment.
It is unrealistic to expect that judges will ever be certain of
the correctness of their decisions.2 2 9 Moreover, it is impossible
for a physician to state to a level of moral certainty that the diagnosis that a person's situation is hopeless is correct. 23 0 To require such a level of proof would effectively preclude the
termination of treatment.
Additionally, it is overly simplistic to suggest that adopting a
"wait and see" attitude toward these decisions is merely maintaining the status quo. In the case of Nancy Cruzan, the status quo
only existed because medical personnel initiated life support. 23 '
If paramedics had not begun artificial respiration or if hospital
personnel had not surgically inserted the gastrostomy tube, the
status quo would have been her death in 1983 from the injuries
sustained in the automobile accident.2 3 2 The status quo for
Nancy Cruzan was "to a large extent a predictable, yet accidental
confluence of technology, psyche, and inertia." 233 Once treat228. See, e.g., In re Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 305 (Il. 1989) (Ward, J.,
dissenting) (discussing substituted judgment standard and chances of error
under that approach).
229. In re Minor, 434 N.E.2d 601, 610 (Mass. 1982) (noting that "[t]o require judges in reviewing medical judgments to reach a level of moral certainty
...would cause those terminally ill patients involved to suffer unnecessary pain
and loss of dignity" (citation omitted).
230. Id.
231. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 266; see also RAMSEY, supra note 171, at 271. In
discussing the Quinlan case, Ramsey noted:
If there had been reliable information, when Karen was brought to the
hospital, as to how she became comatose, how long she was in a state of
respiratory distress, and what degree of anoxia her brain had suffered,
Karen might not have been placed on a respirator in the first place. Not
knowing why or how long Karen had been comatose, the doctors
rightly began artificial respiration.... But having rightly begun curative
treatment, the physicians then found they could not in conscience stop.
Id.
232. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 320 n.17 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
233. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Nancy K. Rhoden, Litigating Life
and Death, 102 HARV. L. REV. 375, 433 (1988)); see also RAMSEY, supra note 171, at
272 (concluding that treatments which had potential for saving Karen Ann
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ment began, no one was willing to take responsibility for stopping
it. It was medical technology run amuck. The judgment call of a
paramedic or an emergency room doctor should not be allowed
to determine whether an individual will be allowed to die a natural death or be attached to machines in an unconscious state for
many years.
When a decisionmaker refuses to act and adopts a wait and
see attitude, the decision is often cushioned in language that suggests that the person will actually benefit from the decision. The
court often frames its opinion in language that suggests that a
future medical discovery may save the person's life. 23 4 This is

one of the most pernicious rationales; it cloaks an unwillingness
to make a hard choice in the language of altruism.
A refusal to terminate treatment because a future discovery
may save the person reflects "an extraordinary optimism about
the prospects of innovation." 23 5 The probability of such a discovery is infinitesimal. 236 Years pass between an initial discovery and
the creation of technology sufficient to make effective treatment

2 37
available to the public at large.

Quinlan's life became means by which her life was needlessly prolonged). Ramsey suggests that it may be a "routinized conscience" that prevents physicians
from terminating treatment after it becomes apparent that a patient will not recover. Id.
234. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 283.
235. The reluctance of some physicians to make hard choices regarding the
termination of medical treatment is similar to the attitude of some judges in
refusing to allow the termination of treatment. ROTHMAN, supra note 125, at 66.
In discussing the analogous relationship between government regulators and
research scientists, Rothman stated that government officials sometimes
hesitated to intervene in research because they assumed that experiments were likely to prove successful and the drugs under investigation
would turn out to be therapeutic wonders ....
They measured the impact of regulation not by calculating risks but by exaggerating benefits.
Fantasies, not nightmare cases, ruled: the researcher who had a miracle
cure for a deadly disease or who could awaken the comatose patient
ought not to be burdened or bridled with administrative regulations.
Id.
236. For example, in the area of cancer research, the National Cancer Institute has spent over $20 billion during the past twenty years and the American
Cancer Society now raises over $330 million each year. Samuel S. Epstein &
Ralph W. Moss, Have We Lost the War on Cancer?, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 12, 1991, at
C27. Five year survival rates for many types of cancer have remained generally
unaffected by the large investment in research. Id. For example, a bone marrow
transplant costs $100,000 and has a low chance of success. Id. Epstein and
Moss argue that efforts should be more properly focused on the need for prevention through avoidance of carcinogenic agents rather than on seeking a cure
once the cancer has developed. Id.
237. See, e.g., Epstein & Moss, supra note 236, at C27 (observing that despite
massive influx of cancer research dollars "our ability to treat and cure cancer has
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Moreover, Justice Brennan noted in his dissent in Cruzan that
the majority misconceived the relevance of possible medical advances.23 8 He argued that possible advances should not be used
as a reason to force a person to accept medical treatment against
his will. "The possibility of a medical miracle is indeed part of the
calculus, but it is part of the patient's calculus." ' 239 Thus, the possibility of future advances in medicine should not be used as ajustification for denying an incompetent person the right to die
naturally.
Opponents of the right to die often cite to medical miracles
in support of the proposition that medical treatment should not
be terminated. On rare occasions, individuals who were comatose for extended periods regained consciousness, but the evidence is primarily anecdotal. 240 This fantasy has been promoted
in popular culture by the movie Awakenings. 24t The reality, however, is that the actual incidence of recovery from a coma diagnosed as permanent has been infinitesimal. In Brophy, a
neurologist testified that he was aware of only two cases in the
not materially improved over decades"); Thomas H. Maugh, Cystic Fibrosis; Genetic Breakthrough with Mice Hailed By Experts As Major Victory, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 21,
1992, at A29 (noting that even with concentrated work by many scientific
groups, it took three years after gene identified for researchers to be successful
in taking next major step towards cure for cystic fibrosis).
238. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 321 (Brennan, J., dissenting). This is particularly
true for individuals in persistent vegetative states from anoxic brain injury, because the focus of research and treatment advances is on responding more
quickly at the time of injury to minimize damage, not on reversing existing damage. See, e.g., Mark C. Rogers &Jeffrey R. Kirsch, Current Concepts in Brain Resuscitation, 261 JAMA 3143 (1989) (reviewing current treatments given to braininjured patients, all initiated as soon as possible following precipitating event);
Dixie Farley, Head Injuries Require Quick, Skilled Care, FDA CONSUMER, Sept. 1990,
at 8 (describing emergency response systems in place to treat head injury and
need for immediate diagnosis and treatment to limit long-term effects).
239. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 321 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
240. See In re Colyer, 660 P.2d 738, 754 n.1 (Wash. 1983) (en banc) (Dore,
J., dissenting). In Colyer, Justice Dore discussed Dr. Lev Landau, 1962 Nobel
Prize winner in physics, who suffered severe brain damage as the result of an
automobile accident. Id. (Dore, J., dissenting). Dr. Landau was comatose for an
extended period, he required ventilatory support for seven weeks and had a "flat
EEG" reading for 100 days. Id. (Dore, J., dissenting). Later, he miraculously
recovered and resumed his research. Id. (Dore, J., dissenting).
Anecdotes such as this, however, should not be used as the basis for
preventing all families from terminating treatment when a patient is in a coma.
Recovery after seven weeks in a coma is certainly unusual; however, seven weeks
is a considerably shorter period of time than the comatose period for most of the
individuals whose families are seeking to terminate treatment. For examples of
the length of time patients remained in comas, see infra note 328.
241. AWAKENINGS (Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. 1990). Even in
AWAKENINGS, however, the patients' recovery was not permanent. Id.
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medical literature where the person recovered cognitive awareness after one month in a persistent vegetative state.2 4 2 Neither
of the individuals described by the neurologist recovered completely.2 43 Thousands of people should not be doomed to spend
decades in comas because a handful may recover consciousness.
5.

Youth Withdraw Medical Treatmentfrom the Elderly

Another assumption relied on by some judges is that medical
treatment is more quickly withdrawn from the elderly. The suspicion, however, that healthy young and middle-aged people are
waiting to terminate medical treatment to rid the world of sick
and aging individuals is unfounded. Although this is a frequently
articulated assumption, there is no documented case law that supports the perception that the young readily withdraw treatment
from the elderly that the elderly would have wanted. 244 In contrast, a survey conducted by Gallup indicated that older individuals are more willing to have treatment terminated than younger
individuals and that only forty-six percent of those surveyed
would be "very willing" to even consider withdrawing treatment
from a family member.2 45 Additionally, in a more formal research
study performed by Uhlmann, the persons surveyed were all over
sixty-five years old and had at least one chronic health problem. 246 Yet, in all three scenarios presented to the respondents,
242. Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 630 n.15
(Mass. 1986) (testimony of Dr. Ronald Cranford).
243. Id. (noting that "[t]hey were left in a state.., worse than the vegetative state"); see also Bonnie Steinbock, Recovery from Persistent Vegetative Stale?: The
Case of Carrie Coons, HASTINGS CENTER REP., July-Aug. 1989, at 14. Mrs. Coons
had a massive stroke in October 1988, and her condition deteriorated. Id. In
November, a gastrostomy tube was surgically inserted and she was diagnosed in
a persistent vegetative state. Id. InJanuary 1989, the sister with whom she had
lived asked that the tube be removed. Id. On April 4, 1989, a New York
Supreme Court judge ruled that the tube could be removed. Id. On April 9, she
regained consciousness and was able to eat a small amount of food and speak
with those around her. Id. Her recovery, however, was very limited. Id. at 15.
Her doctor characterized her as "more or less communicative," but her responses to questions were often inconsistent. Id. She was not competent and
might at any time, lapse back into a vegetative state. Id.
244. There are cases that suggest that courts do consider this assumption.
See, e.g., In re Moorhouse, 593 A.2d 1256, 1257 (N.J. Super. 1991) (allowing sister of elderly woman with Down's syndrome in persistent vegetative state to become patient's guardian because sister had sincere interest in patient's welfare
and had no improper motives in requesting withdrawal of treatment); In re Peter,
529 A.2d 419, 425 n.6 (NJ. 1987) (requiring one-year life expectancy test to be
applied in addition to other considerations when withdrawal request is for elderly senile patients).
245. Steiber, supra note 5, at 72.
246. Uhlmann et al., supra note 42, at M115.
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only fourteen to twenty-three percent of these elderly individuals
stated they would want the treatment of CPR and a ventilator if
they suffered a cardiac arrest. 24 7 In other words, contrary to the
hysteria that the healthy youth will attempt to deprive the elderly
of desired medical care, it is the elderly, themselves facing the
threat of incompetence, who wish to terminate their own medical
treatment even if it results in death.
This hysteria arises on occasion when someone in public life
suggests that there should be anything less than extraordinary
medical treatment for all persons regardless of their prognosis or
wishes. Colorado Governor Richard Lamm discovered this when
he discussed the problem of limited medical resources at a meeting of the Colorado Health Lawyers Association. He created an
uproar when he stated: "Like leaves which fall off a tree forming
the humus in which other plants can grow, we've got a duty to die
and get out of the way with all of our machines and artificial
2 48
hearts, so that our kids can build a reasonable life."
During the next generation, hard choices will need to be
made in the allocation of medical resources. Encompassed within
the issue of allocation is whether life-sustaining measures should
be applied or continued when a person's prognosis is poor. This
difficult issue should not be further complicated by those who
would require treatment under all circumstances. The elderly
themselves generally oppose continued treatment when the prospects for a meaningful existence are limited. Their choice should
be respected.
6. Family Will Terminate Medical Treatmentfor FinancialReasons
One common assumption articulated in support of the need
for decisionmaking by a neutral party is that family members may
have a conflicting interest in relieving themselves of financial or
emotional burdens. The family members who are forced to make
life and death decisions for an incompetent person are generally
the same people who will inherit if the person dies. Moreover, if a
person is kept on life support for an extended period of time, his
estate may be drained by the substantial cost, leaving little for the
survivors to inherit. It is these substantial financial concerns that
raise suspicions about a family's motivation for terminating life
247. Id. at M118 tbl. 2. For a more detailed discussion of the Uhlmann
study, see supra notes 221-24 and accompanying text.
248. Question: Who Will Play God?, Colorado's Governor Causes a Furor on the Issue
of Dying, TIME, Apr. 9, 1984, at 68 (quoting Gov. Lamm).
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support. In point of fact, however, these are rarely the prime motivating factors behind a decision to cease treatment.
People are uncomfortable making life and death decisions for
others. In the Gallup survey, when asked whether they would be
willing to terminate life support for a family member, the percentage dropped significantly from those who would be willing to terminate their own life support. Only forty-six percent were "very
willing" to disconnect machines for someone else in comparison
to seventy percent who were "very willing" to disconnect their
own machines.2 4 9 Even when "somewhat willing" was added,
only seventy-two percent were willing to disconnect another's machines, a ten percent drop from the number willing to disconnect
their own life support systems. 2 50 Similarly, in the Uhlmann
study, individuals consistently overestimated their spouse's resus25
citation preferences. '
A family member should not be disqualified from making the
decision to withdraw treatment simply because he or she will benefit from the person's will.2 52 In Colyer, the court recognized that
"[i]n most instances, the familial relationship will strengthen, and
not undermine, the guardian's best judgment in exercising the
personal rights of the incompetent.- 25 3 Courts look for greed
even where none exists. Yet, in no case, from Quinlan to the recent decision in Lawrance,254 was there any evidence that the families were motivated by financial considerations. Nevertheless,
courts often mention this issue and occasionally rely on it as a
basis for their decision. For example, the Illinois Supreme Court
in Longeway required a court order before treatment could be discontinued "to guard against the remote, yet real possibility that
greed may taint the judgment of the surrogate decision25 5
maker."
Additionally, it is not only the family members who may have
249. Steiber, supra note 5, at 72.
250. Id.
251. Uhlmann et al., supra note 42, at M117.
252. In re Colyer, 660 P.2d 738, 747 n.4 (Wash. 1983) (en banc).
253. Id.; see also In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1218 (N.J. 1985). In Conroy,
the patient's nephew was her only surviving blood relative. Id. He visited his
aunt once a week for four to five years in the years preceding her incapacitation.
Id. The court concluded that the inheritance that the nephew might receive created no conflict of interest to cause the court to question his intentions. Id.
254. In re Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d 32, 42 (Ind. 1991).
255. In re Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 300 (Ill. 1989). The holding in
Longeway could more accurately be referred to as the full-employment-for-lawyers ruling.

HeinOnline -- 38 Vill. L. Rev. 152 1993

1993]

SURROGATE DECISIONMAKING

a financial stake in the outcome. The hospitals, nursing homes
and, to a lesser extent, even the doctors will be financially affected
by the outcome.2 5 6 Whether the person's bills are being paid by
insurance, Medicare or Medicaid, the payments will cease if treat2 57
ment is terminated and the person dies.
Finally, if the family's goal in terminating treatment is to be
relieved of the financial and emotional hardships associated with
the person's illness, they have a much easier way out. They can
just walk away. For example, Mr. and Mrs. Cruzan could have
deserted their daughter like Nancy's husband did. 258 They chose
to fight in the courts, however, because they believed that it was
what their daughter wanted. When a family tries to terminate
treatment, they do it out of love, because in many cases the family
25 9
has no financial responsibility for the person's care.
There is no question that in many family decisions, family
members have conflicting interests. There is no evidence, however, that families are allowing financial concerns to override the
best interests of the person when making medical care decisions.
256. See Grace Plaza of Great Neck, Inc. v. Elbaum, 588 N.Y.S.2d 853 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1992). In Grace Plaza, a nursing home did not inform a patient's family
at the time of the patient's admission of its policy refusing to remove feeding
tubes. Id. at 867 (Rosenblatt, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The
patient was admitted conditioned on her husband's agreement to pay for her
care. Id. at 854. One year after she was admitted, her husband requested that
her feeding tube be withdrawn. Id. at 855. When the nursing home refused, her
husband refused to pay the charges. Id. During the next two years more than
$110,000 in fees accrued. See Cerisse Anderson, Fees Held Due to Nursing Home,
N.Y. L.J., Sept. 24, 1992, at 1. The Appellate Division held that the patient's
husband was liable for fees incurred after the nursing home refused to withdraw
artificial nutrition. Grace Plaza, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 854. Even the majority conceded the dissent's contention that health care providers have a financial incentive to prolong the lives of comatose patients over the objections of their
families. Id. at 860.
257. See, e.g., Peter Kerr, Treating of Severe Brain Injuries Is Profitable, But Not
for Patients, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1992, at Al.
258. I use the term "desert" advisedly but with reservations. The Missouri
Supreme Court makes reference to the fact that Nancy's husband was granted a
divorce in 1984, after two years of marriage and one year after the accident.
Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 431 (Mo. 1988) (en banc) (Higgins, J., dissenting) (quoting trial court opinion), aff'd sub nom. Cruzan v. Director, Mo.
Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); id. at 427 n.1 (Blackmar, J., dissenting)
(noting that "[t]his circumstance alone indicates a relativity of values"); see also
Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 300 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (patient
lived with parents until told by father that family could no longer provide care);
In re Minor, 434 N.E.2d 601, 602 (Mass. 1982) (child abandoned at birth by
mother); Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d
417, 420 (Mass. 1977) (patient's only relatives were two sisters who did not want
to be involved).
259. For example, in Cruzan, the costs of long-term care were borne by the
state. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 411 n.2.
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In the absence of more than pure speculation, this perceived conflict of interest should not be used as a basis for removing family
decisionmaking authority from those who know the person best,
who care most for the person and who the person would probably
want to make the decision.
7.

Removal of Life-Sustaining Treatment Is a Step Toward Euthanasia

Judges occasionally give voice to another insidious assumption-that if persons on life support are allowed to die, the next
step on the "slippery slope" 2 60 will be active euthanasia of the
handicapped and elderly. For example, Justice Schreiber, writing
for the majority in Conroy stated: "More wide-ranging powers to
make decisions about other people's lives, in our view, would create an intolerable risk for socially isolated and defenseless people
suffering from physical or mental handicaps. "261 "Right-to-life"
groups paint a dismal portrait of a future in which all individuals
who are mentally retarded or physically handicapped 262 will be
denied medical treatment.2 6 3 One dissent has even drawn an
analogy to the war crimes in Nazi Germany. 264 This analogy is
260. In re Grant, 747 P.2d 445, 458 (Wash. 1987) (Andersen,J, dissenting).
261. In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1233 (N.J. 1985).
262. The situation of the physically handicapped in particular is a red herring. The physically handicapped are competent and, therefore, make their own
medical decisions. Under decisions like Bouvia, these individuals have the right
to refuse medical treatment. See Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 300-01 (discussing
right of competent individuals to make medical treatment decisions). The only
limitation is the right of the state to prevent suicide. For a discussion of the
state's interest in preventing suicide, see supra notes 207-11 and accompanying
text.
263. See, e.g., Nancy M. Czerwiec, Surrogate Law, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 7, 1991, at
CIO (letter to editor by director of The Human Life Resource Center attacking
living wills and durable powers of attorney for health care and alleging that
"these two legal documents are part of the strategic plan of action of euthanasia
leaders in America").
264. In re Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 313 (Il1. 1989) (Clark, J., dissenting).
In Longeway, Justice Clark quoted Dr. Leo Alexander, a medical consultant at the
Nazi war crimes trials:
Whatever proportions these crimes finally assumed, it became evident to all who investigated them that they had startedfrom small beginnings. The beginnings at first were merely a subtle shift in emphasis in
the basic attitude of physicians. It started with the acceptance of the
attitude, basic in the euthanasia movement, that there is such a thing as
life not worthy to be lived.
Id. (Clark, J., dissenting) (quoting Dr. Alexander). After making the parallel t'o
doctors in Nazi Germany, Justice Clark then denied that he was drawing the
analogy saying that he was not "equat[ing] the decision before this court in any
manner to the horror of decisions and actions made before and during the war."
Id. (Clark, J., dissenting); see also Yale Kamisar, Some Non-Religious Views Against
Proposed "Mercy-Killing" Legislation, 42 MINN. L. REV. 969, 1030-36 (1958) (mak-
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inaccurate and unwarranted. Proponents of the "right-to-die" do
not suggest, explicitly or implicitly, that the mentally handicapped
do not have the right to live and should therefore be
26 5
euthanized.
The use of terms such as "quality of life" and "degrading"
obscure the issue. 26 6 Although a competent quadriplegic may
have a lower quality of life than a mobile individual, given the
choice, most quadriplegics would prefer to continue living as is
evidenced by the paucity of cases similar to Bouvia. 26 7 Similarly,
while severely retarded individuals may not appreciate the world
in the same manner as most others, they are conscious and enjoy
life on their own terms. Families with children burdened with severe mental disabilities recognize this and consequently continue
2 68
to love and care for their disabled children.
The cases involving termination of life-sustaining treatment
generally involve individuals who were mentally competent but
because of accident or illness have lost all mental capacity. For
example, Nancy Cruzan was "oblivious to her environment except for reflexive responses to sound and perhaps painful stimuli." 26 9

Much of her brain had deteriorated and had been

replaced by fluid. 270 After seven years in a vegetative state, she
had no chance of regaining consciousness.2 7 1 Her case was not
atypical. Even in a situation in which the withdrawal of treatment
petition was for a mentally handicapped person, the family did
not seek to deny medical treatment merely to be rid of the
ing "parade of horrors" argument based in large part on Nazi Germany
experience).
265. See, e.g., DECIDING TO FOREGO TREATMENT, supra note 3, at 29 (cautioning that "slippery slope arguments are themselves subject to abuse in social and
legal policy debate").
266. "[T]here is no intrinsic reason why a quality-of-life standard must remain any more vague and undefined than a standard that includes pain." In re
Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1249 (NJ. 1985) (Handler, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
267. Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 297 (Cal. Ct. App.
1986).
268. See, e.g., In re Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d 32, 35 (Ind. 1991) (family cared
for retarded child for 33 years); In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 68 (N.Y.) (observing
that patient's elderly mother lived near facility and visited her severely retarded
son almost daily), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
269. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 266 n.l (1990).
270. Id. at 321 n.18 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
271. Id. at 266. In the medical literature of the past 20 years, only three
persons in a persistent vegetative state due to oxygen deprivation have even
partially recovered. Id. at 309 n.8 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Brief of
American Medical Association as Amici Curiae at 11-12, Cruzan v. Director, Mo.
Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (No. 88-1503)).
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individual. 2 72
A decision to terminate life-supporting treatment is only a
decision to allow nature to take its course. It is not a first step on
the road to euthanasia of the handicapped.
8.

Religions Oppose Termination of Life-Sustaining Treatment

The final assumption is that religious opposition to the termination of life-sustaining treatment precludes such withdrawal.
Other than religious based "right to life" groups, however, there
is little religious opposition to terminating life-sustaining treatment. Although religious reasons are often cited by those who
wish to force continuation of apparently futile treatment, organized religion does not generally oppose termination of treatment.
For example, the Catholic Church has been described as opposed to withdrawal of treatment. But, in the seminal Quinlan
case, the family's priest and the New Jersey Catholic Conference
supported the parents' position to terminate care.2 7 3 Additionally, the Catholic Conference of Illinois, comprised of Cardinal
Bernadin and the other Catholic bishops in Illinois, supported the
Illinois Health Care Surrogate Act, 2 74 which allows a surrogate to
terminate artificial nutrition and hydration. 27 5
The Roman Catholic Church has stated that there is no need
to artificially prolong life. Specifically, the 1980 Vatican Declaration on Euthanasia stated:
When inevitable death is imminent in spite of the
means used, it is permitted in conscience to take the decision to refuse forms of treatment that would only secure a precarious and burdensome prolongation of life,
so long as the normal care due the sick person in similar
272. See Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d at 34.
273. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 658 (N.J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922
(1976); see also In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1218 (N.J. 1985) (referring to
priest's testimony that removal of feeding tube was consistent with teachings of
church).
274. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, paras. 851-1 to -55 (Supp. 1992).
275. Id.; see also ILL. 87TH GEN. ASSEMBLY H.R. TRANSCRIPTION DEBATE 1
(June 28, 1991) (statement of Rep. Dunn). There appears to be a split, however,
among the church hierarchy on this issue; Cardinal O'Connor, Archbishop of
New York, has opposed termination of artificial nutrition and hydration. Id. at 34 (statement of Rep. McCracken); see also Matters of Life or Death Are Also Questions
of Ethics and Morals, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1992, at B4 (discussing split of opinion
between Catholic bishops regarding withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration from individuals in persistent vegetative states).
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cases is not interrupted. 2 76
In this context, the church recognized that "it is very important to
protect, at the moment of death, both the dignity of the human
person and the Christian concept of life against a technological
277
attitude that threatens to become an abuse."
In the area of living will legislation, Catholic groups have frequently been in the forefront of the opposition. 2 7 Catholic authors, however, have suggested that the reasons for the
opposition do not include disagreement with the generalized
right to refuse medical treatment.2 79 Instead, the concerns which
prompt Catholic groups to oppose living will legislation arise
from the fear that these bills will move society toward acceptance
of euthanasia. 2 0 Two Catholic theologians who previously opposed living will legislation 2 8 ' now support it, in part because the
position of some of "the more radical right-to-life advocates
threatens the traditional Catholic position on the sanctity of life
and the rights of the individual, in the Vatican's phrasing, 'to refuse forms of treatment that would only secure a precarious and
burdensome prolongation of life.' "282
Although specific religious groups may oppose termination
of life-support treatment even when there is no chance for recovery, organized religion itself does not oppose such termination.
Its opposition is often based on a different political agenda that
includes opposition to abortion and euthanasia. In any case, religious opposition should not be an underlying assumption used to
defeat surrogate decisionmaking in our diverse society, particularly in light of the First Amendment.
276. Vatican Declaration on Euthanasia, ORIGINS, Aug. 14, 1980, at 154, 156.
277. Id.
278. Paris & McCormick, supra note 174, at 87.
279. Id. at 86.
280. RAMSEY, supra note 171, at 319. In earlier years, Catholic leaders had
opposed defining brain death because they were concerned that the next type of
legislation might legalize abortion. ROTHMAN, supra note 125, at 164-65.
281. Theologians Paris and McCormick objected to living will legislation
because
[t]here is no need for it; the potential for misunderstanding about the
proper locus of decision making in the patient-physician relationship;
the danger that those without a living will are presumed to want all
possible treatments; the exclusion of the family from participation in
decision-making; and the possibility that the state, construing the right
to refuse treatment as a conferral rather than a natural right-one with
inherent moral limitations-could also confer the right to be killed.
Paris & McCormick, supra note 174, at 87.
282. Id.
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The previous eight subsections have discussed the presumptions that underlie judicial decisions on whether to terminate lifesupport treatment. These presumptions inaccurately represent
what most people believe and how they wish treatment decisions
were made. The following proposal reverses these presumptions
and allows families to make the critical and very personal decision
about when treatment should be withdrawn.
IV.

THE CASE FOR SURROGATE DECISIONMAKERS

This part of the Article offers a proposal for family decisionmaking that reverses the assumptions made in the previous section. It gives an order of priority for determining which family
member will make medical treatment decisions, identifies those
who have standing to contest the decisionmaker's choice and
reverses the burden of proof. This part then discusses the advantages of family decisionmaking. The advantages include returning exclusive control over medical decisions to those who
best know the person's wishes and care most about the person.
At the same time, outsiders with political agenda are deprived of
the opportunity to capitalize on a family's misfortune. Following
this proposal would also help to avoid the cost, time and additional trauma involved in judicial intervention.
Finally, this part discusses the disadvantages of family decisionmaking. Most of the problems identified also exist under the
status quo. The proposed system cannot avoid court involvement
when a person is part of a dysfunctional family, when a person's
family cannot agree or when a person does not have close family
members. The only disadvantage unique to the proposal is defining the narrow circumstances under which a court should be allowed to deprive the family of the right to decide. This part
concludes with a brief discussion of the right of conscience.
A.

Proposalfor Family Decisionmaking

A statute naming a surrogate decisionmaker would become
applicable when: (1) a person has not executed a durable power
of attorney for health care, 283 and (2) a person is incapable of
making medical decisions.
283. Only a durable power of attorney for health care obviates the need for
a statutory surrogate decisionmaker. A living will only provides evidence of
what an individual would want in certain, often narrow, circumstances. Someone must still make the decision. Thus, a living will would not replace the surrogate decisionmaker.
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The proposed statute would provide a list of family members
who would have the power to act as a surrogate decisionmaker.
No court appointment would be necessary to exercise the power.
The order of priority would be: spouse, parents, adult children,
adult grandchildren, siblings, a close friend or relative and a
court-appointed guardian. Thus, for example, if the spouse of
the person were living and competent, the spouse would be the
surrogate decisionmaker; if the person were not married, the person's parents would be the surrogate decisionmakers.
The surrogate decisionmaker would have the power to make
all medical decisions on behalf of the person. This power would
include the power to terminate or to continue medical treatment.
The power would include termination of respirators, artificial nutrition and hydration as well as other technologies that have not
yet been developed.
A rebuttable presumption would be created that the surrogate decisionmaker's decision is in the best interests of the individual. The only parties with standing to attack the decision of
the surrogate decisionmaker would be other family members,
close friends, or in the case of abuse, the state.
The standard for an attack on the decision by one with standing would be that the surrogate's decision is contrary to the expressed wishes of the person. This essentially reverses the
burden of proof in the substituted judgment test; instead of requiring evidence of the person's desires in order to terminate
treatment, clear and convincing evidence of the person's desires
would be required to overturn the decision of the surrogate.
For the state to attack the surrogate's decision, it must show
that, in the past, the surrogate abused the person or that the particular decision constitutes abuse. Abuse would be defined to
mean that no responsible physician would implement the choice;
it must be outside the boundaries of acceptable medical practice. 28 4 Physicians and hospitals would no longer have the right
284. As discussed infra text accompanying notes 303-06, this definition of
abuse would allow termination of treatment if the decision is reasonable in light
of the patient's personal or religious views even though the decision might be
unreasonable to the vast majority of people. For example, a patient's family
could refuse a blood transfusion for a critically ill patient on basis that the incompetent patient is aJehovah's Witness and such a transfusion violates the tenets of the religion.
The standard of "abuse" has some parallels to Nancy Rhoden's standard of
unreasonableness. Nancy K. Rhoden, LitigatingLife and Death, 102 HARV. L. REV.
375, 437 (1988). She defines reasonableness as "turn[ing] on the question
whether the patient retains any capacity to experience and enjoy life." Id. One
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to challenge a decision merely because they do not agree with the
decision.
B. Advantages of Family Decisionmaking
Life and death decisions about medical care are family decisions that should be made without the expensive and time consuming interference of the courts. As discussed in Part III,
people generally do not want life-sustaining medical treatment if
they have no chance for recovery. Thus, the basic goal of the proposal is to put the decisionmaking power back with the family
where it belongs. Treatment should not be imposed when it is
not wanted, and it should not be denied when it is desired. Family members who know the person's desires and who care about
him should make the decision.
1. No One Cares More About the Person Than Family
Medical decisionmaking for an incompetent person should
rest with the person's family because no one loves the person
more than his own family.2 8 5 Traditionally, certain decisions
were made solely within the confines of the family.2 8 6 Society
respected the family's decisions in these areas and did not even
attempt to determine whether the decision made was the best decision. Justice Douglas, in his concurrence in Roe v. Wade, 28 7 enumerated some of the areas within this zone of family privacy:
marriage, divorce, procreation, contraception and the education
and upbringing of children.2 8 8 For example, in Pierce v. Society of
Sisters,2 8 9 the Supreme Court upheld the right of parents to educate their children in a religious school. Significantly, the Court
recognized that "those who nurture him and direct his destiny
of the differences between my thesis and that of Rhoden, however, is that she
would allow the physician to challenge the decision on the basis of reasonableness. Id.
285. See, e.g., Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 493 n.2 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1983) (indicating that some family members were at hospital nearly around
the clock).
286. See In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 445 (N.J. 1987) (noting that "law has
traditionally respected the private realm of family life which the state cannot
enter" (quoting In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404, 414 (N.J. 1987))). TheJobes court
stated that the "tradition of respect for and confidence in the family" should be
the basis for judicial restraint in the area of medical treatment. Id. (quoting In re
Farrell, 529 A.2d 404, 414 (N.J. 1987)).
287. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 209 (1973) (Justice Douglas stated
that his opinion also applied to Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
288. Id. at 211-13.
289. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and pre290
pare him for additional obligations."
It is impossible for anyone to determine exactly what is right
and what is wrong in these withdrawal of treatment situations.
Personal values are inextricably bound with what is in the best
interests of the person. The question thus becomes: who should
make the decision? There are really only two choices: family or
strangers.
Some might suggest that there are two additional choices:
physician decisionmaking and joint decisionmaking by some combination of family, physician, hospital ethics committee and
judge. These additional decisionmaker options, however, are really subsets of the class of strangers. In our mobile society, it is
now rare for an individual's physician to be a family practitioner
who has known the person both personally and professionally for
many years. Thus, the doctor is generally a stranger. 29 1 This is
even more true if the person is in an intensive care unit as is often
the situation in cases involving the removal of life-sustaining
treatment. In such a setting, the patient is surrounded by specialists whom he has probably never met. 2 92 The physician may be a
stranger with specialized knowledge and good motives, but he is a
stranger nonetheless. The joint decisionmaker is also essentially
a stranger. Although the family is involved in the process, if there
is disagreement, it is still the stranger, either a judge or a hospital
ethics committee, who makes the decision.
Over the past decade, society has gradually shifted away from
the doctrine of family autonomy as the basis for medical decisionmaking to the view that the state is the best decisionmaker. There
is a fundamental problem, however, with replacing the family as
the decisionmaker with a stranger-even a well-meaning stranger
is incapable of caring for the person as much as the person's fam290. Id. at 535.
291. Physicians have become a social group apart from their patients.
ROTHMAN, supra note 125, at 108. "It is not romanticizing the past practice of
medicine to observe that in the pre-World War II period, physicians were more
closely connected both to their patients and their community." Id. at 109.
292. Because specialists generally have no acquaintance with their patients
prior to the initial consultation, the specialist was not chosen by the patient
based on common religious or social views. Id. at 128-29. This reinforces the
argument that the family and not the doctor should make the decision, particularly if the goal is substituted judgment. Additionally, in the ICU setting, the
physicians may be more likely to provide treatment even a competent patient
would not want. See ZUSSMAN, supra note 13, at 83 (observing that ICU physicians frequently persist in providing treatment, even in face of patient's explicit
refusal).
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ily. There are four basic reasons that families are inherently better decisionmakers than strangers.
First, families generally exhibit more concern about the welfare of the person than anyone else. Families spend time with the
person at the hospital and assist the medical personnel in caring
for and in comforting him. Family members often advise and
counsel the person faced with treatment decisions. One study
noted that families ask the medical staff more questions about the
individual's condition and prognosis than even the competent
person does. 2 93 As a result, family members often become advocates for persons who, although competent, find it difficult to as2 94
sert themselves in their weakened condition.
Second, and even more importantly, it is the family that has
to live with the decision.2 95 Much discussion has focused on the
argument that families may wish to terminate treatment in order
to relieve themselves of the emotional and financial burdens associated with caring for the person.2 9 6 That argument neglects the
fact that guilt and the fear of making the wrong decision for a
loved one may actually cause the family to continue treatment
2 97
even if it is contrary to the person's best interests.
Third, contrary to common belief, physicians are not impar293. See Charles W. Lidz & Alan Meisel, Informed Consent and the Structure of
Medical Care, in 2 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 5, at 317, 396-97.
294. In reJobes, 529 A.2d 434, 445 (N.J. 1987); Steven A. Newman, Treatment Refusals for the Critically and Terminally Ill." Proposed Rules for the Family, the
Physician, and the State, 3 N.Y.L. SCH. HUM. RTS. ANN. 35, 45 (1985).
295. Duff & Campbell, supra note 15, at 892 (proposing that patient's families should control decisionmaking process, with external sources only providing
general guidelines for decisionmaking); see also Michael Villaire, The Cruzans Talk
About Nancy, the Critical Care Experience and Their New Mission, CRITICAL CARE
NURSE, Dec. 1992, at 80. When asked whether the Cruzan family thought the
priorities of the healthcare system seemed reversed, Mr. Cruzan stated:
Yes .... The administrator at the hospital said he had a great deal of
difficulty participating, from a moral standpoint, in Nancy's death.
Well, as far as I'm concerned, that wasn't his call to make. We made
that decision; the only hands-on thing he had to do was to implement
the decision. If anyone has to be held accountable for Nancy's death, it
will be me. And I don't have any problem with it. I think I did what she
would have wanted me to do. And frankly, she's the only person that
I've got to answer to.
Id. at 83-84.
296. For a discussion of this assumption, see supra notes 249-59 and accompanying text.
297. Duff & Campbell, supra note 15, at 893 ("Families, similarly may have
mixed motives. They may demand death to obtain relief from the high costs and
the tensions inherent in suffering, but their sense of guilt in this thought may
produce the opposite demand, perhaps in violation of the sick person's rights.").
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tial observers. They also may face conflicts of interest.2 98 For example, when infants are involved, they are frequently transferred
to hospitals with neonatal intensive care units. The resident physicians may have a vested interest in aggressively treating a dying
child.2 99 Physicians' interests in advancing their own training or
advancing the state of research in the field may conflict with the
00
interest of individual infants and their families.3
Finally, a person's family is adversely affected by his incapacitation. When the family considers the adverse impact of the person's illness on the family unit, it is considering exactly what the
person himself would consider. Most persons do not want to become a burden to their families. Few want the fruits of their life's
labors decimated by a futile attempt to treat the last stages of a
painful terminal illness, or worse, to be kept alive in a coma for
years.
Even when infants are involved it is overly simplistic and selfrighteous to argue that all possible treatment should be provided
no matter what the prognosis. Living with a severely handicapped child is a family affair.3 0 ' There are limits to what a family
298. See, e.g., Harold E. Bronheim, Medical Views of Capacity to Make Health
Care Decisions, in HANDLING YOUR FIRST HEALTH CARE PROXY, LIVING WILL, AND
DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY, supra note 2, at 443. Dr. Bronheim stated:
For the physician, too, there is a negative incentive not to institute
treatment. First, a determination not to institute treatment involves
painstaking discussion with the family, patient, and staff. Everybody's
anxiety must be allayed that everything possible has been considered
and the best course of action is to let death take its natural course. This
effort requires many hours of deliberation and consultation, none of
which will be reimbursed. Our third party payor system rewards doctors for providing treatments, not for comforting patients and families
and withholding treatment. It is much easier to spend 15 minutes ordering an intravenous line with antibiotics which can maintain a dying
patient for weeks, who can then be followed daily with examinations all
of which is reimbursable, than it is to spend eight hours consulting everybody involved to allow the patient to die peacefully, all of which is not
reimbursed.
Id. at 452.
299. Duff& Campbell, supra note 15, at 892.
300. Id. (noting fear of some physicians that loss of infant through lack of
treatment would deprive medical profession of "teaching material" and compromise training of medical professionals).
301. Id. Duff and Campbell discussed the experience of the special care
nursery of Yale-New Haven Hospital during the period 1970-1972. Id. at 890.
In one case, a five-month-old child with chronic pulmonary disease still required
40% oxygen to survive after much treatment. Id. at 891. All persons involved
were very attached to this child and did not want to see the child die, making it
very difficult to terminate treatment. Id. The financial and emotional burdens
on the family were thought to be threatening the marriage and sibling relationships. Id. Treatment was eventually stopped and the baby died within hours.
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can and should have to bear. Furthermore, is society any better
today because doctors can "save" a child who would have died if
he had been born only ten or twenty years ago. 30 2
The question is not whether the person can be kept alive by
medical technology but whether he should be kept alive. Outsiders who will walk away once the medical treatment has been completed cannot make that decision. Only the family members who
have to live with results of the treatment can make that decision.
Thus, because the family cares about the person as an individual
human being and not as one more patient or case study, the family should make the decision about whether to continue life-sustaining treatment.
2.

No One Knows the Person's Religious Beliefs and Personal Values
Better Than Family

Knowledge of a person's wishes is critical to any decision
about life-sustaining treatment, and no one knows the person's
wishes better than close family or friends. Courts developed the
theory of substituted judgment in an attempt to reach a result
consistent with the person's desires. 3° 3 The problem with the
substituted judgment test is that the person often has not expressed his desires in language that satisfies evidentiary stanId. at 891-92. The baby's death seemed to correct the family's problems, and 18
months later, they had another healthy baby. Id. at 892. This situation raises the
question of who has the right to determine whether a child should be aggressively treated indefinitely despite his prognosis and the effects on the remainder
of the family? The thesis of this Article is that only the family has the right to
choose.
302. See, e.g., Anthony Shaw, Dilemmas of "Informed Consent" in Children, 289
NEw ENG. J. MED. 885, 889 (1973). Dr. Shaw effectively summarizes the problem with saving the lives of permanently disabled children when he states:
All pediatric surgeons, including myself, have "triumphs"-infants
who, if they had been born 25 or even five years ago, would not have
been salvageable. Now ... we can wind up with "viable" children three
and four years old, well below the third percentile in height and weight,
propped up on a pillow, marginally tolerating an oral diet of sugar and
amino acids and looking forward to another operation.

Id.

There is also the question few are willing to discuss: should a severely
handicapped infant be saved if the child will face life in an institution? Institutionalization has an adverse, usually disastrous affect on healthy children. Duff
& Campbell, supra note 15, at 892. Are we a more humane society because we
have "saved" a severely handicapped child from death when the child's life will
be spent in an institution? See generally STINSON & STINSON, supra note 170 (discussing authors' experiences as parents of premature child who suffered from
serious birth defects and who was treated against parents' wishes).
303. For a discussion of the substituted judgment test, see supra notes 3150 and accompanying text.
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dards.30 4 However, what is unclear to the judge, who is a
stranger, may be obvious to a family member who understands
the person's attitudes towards medical care and general view of
life and the world.3 0 5 The family knows "the motives and consid30 6
erations that would control the patient's medical decisions."
There is a special bond between family members based on their
shared experience that allows them to understand each other
much better than those outside the family understand them.
Nonetheless, this knowledge is often intuitive, causing difficulties
when family members attempt to translate this knowledge into evidence to be presented at a hearing.
Although there are substantial flaws with the substituted
judgment test, the problems are in the implementation of the test,
not the goal of the test. The person's beliefs and opinions should
be the focus of the medical treatment decision. There may be no
way to present objective evidence of the person's preferences;
however, close family members generally have a sense of what a
person would have wanted. They know how the person lived his
life and how person's religious and personal values affected the
his decisionmaking.
The burden of proof currently rests on family members to
prove that the person would want treatment terminated. This
burden should be shifted to require the one challenging the family's decision to terminate treatment to prove that the person
would have wanted the treatment to continue. The resulting decision, although not infallible, will more closely approximate the
person's intent. It will be based on knowledge of the person's
desires not limited by artificial rules of evidence.
3.

Strangers With PoliticalAgenda Should Not Be Allowed to Intervene

In recent years, there has been a proliferation of "right to
life" groups. These groups no longer focus solely on abortion;
they are also active in opposing the termination of medical treatment. For example, these groups were instrumental in convincing the Reagan Administration to issue regulations preventing
the termination of treatment for neonates. 30 7 Today they invariably appear as amicus against a family that seeks to have life sup304. For examples of language that courts have found inadequate to satisfy
the substituted judgment test, see supra notes 47-59 and accompanying text.
305. In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 445 (N.J. 1987).
306. Id.
307. See Claudia Wallis, The Stormy Legacy of Baby Doe; Should the Government
Try to Save Severely Afflicted Infants?, TiME, Sept. 26, 1983, at 58.
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port equipment or feeding tubes removed from a dying family
member. These groups do not see the patient as a person but as
a symbol of a cause.
For example, in Lawrance, a group called the Christian Fellowship with the Disabled sought guardianship of a person who
was permanently unconscious.3 0 8 Amazingly, not only did the
trial court allow them standing, it appointed the group's attorney
as the guardian of Sue Ann Lawrance.3 09 Unfortunately, this is
not an isolated incident. For example, when a Missouri father recently sought to move his daughter to a private hospital that was
willing to disconnect her feeding tube, an unrelated anti-abortion
activist was granted a temporary restraining order to prevent the
move.3 10 This type of interference is unacceptable because it allows an incompetent person to become the pawn of special interest groups that should be lobbying the legislature rather than
interfering in a family tragedy.
In In re Greenspan,3 1 both the guardian ad litem, appointed by
the court to represent the person's interests for purposes of the
litigation, and the public guardian agreed that artificial nutrition
and hydration should be terminated. The guardian ad litem informed the court that he was unable to find a physician to testify
in favor of continuing treatment.3 1 2 The court then allowed
Americans United for Life Legal Defense Fund to appear as a
3 13
party to argue against the family.
Judges are so accustomed to the adversary nature of most
legal proceedings that they sometimes search to find a party with
a contrary view even when that party is a stranger to the litigation
and is using the litigation to forward its own agenda. Intervention of such lobbying groups does not benefit the person and
should not be allowed to continue. By changing the legal presumption to favor family decisionmaking, political groups will be
prevented from turning private tragedies into political soapboxes.
308. In re Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d 32, 36 (Ind. 1991).
309. Id. One week after appointing Patti Mullins as guardian, the court appointed Daniel Avila, an attorney with the National Legal Center for the Medically Disabled and Dependent, as successor guardian. Id.
310. See Staci D. Kramer, Father Regains Control in Right-to-Die Case, CHI.
TRIB., Feb. 20, 1993, at N2 (indicating that once Missouri courts had dismissed
case, thereby allowing father of comatose patient to move daughter, unrelated
third party was allowed to intervene in attempt to block move).
311. 558 N.E.2d 1194, 1199 (Il. 1990).
312. Id. at 1197.
313. Id. at 1199.
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4. Judicial Intervention in Medical Decisionmaking Is Costly and
Unnecessarily Intrusive
Family decisionmaking also allows families to avoid the burdens of litigation. Litigation is expensive. Many, perhaps most,
families facing high medical expenses do not also have the resources to pay an attorney. Hospitals and nursing homes, on the
other hand, typically have substantial resources. Thus, if a hospital wishes to oppose the family's petition, it has the financial ability to fight a long court battle, including any lengthy appeals
31 4
process.
Even when the hospital does not object, a state requirement
that a court order must be obtained before terminating medical
treatment may pose an overwhelming obstacle for some families. 31 5 Complex medical, legal and ethical situations are commonplace for health care providers, hospital administrators and
lawyers. The vast majority of the population, however, faced with
314. See Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 627
(Mass. 1986) (hospital and physicians opposed termination of nutrition and hydration); see also In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 75 (N.Y.) Jones, J., dissenting in
part), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981). In Storar, the administrator of the residential facility where the patient lived petitioned to continue the blood transfusions. Id. at 69. JusticeJones, in dissent, argued that the case should have been
dismissed based on the hospital's lack of standing. Id. at 77 (Jones,J., dissenting
in part). "Medical care providers have at best only a tangential interest in the
outcome of the litigation and can have no legitimate individual stake in the institution (or continuation) or the discontinuance of the medical procedure." Id.
(Jones, J., dissenting in part).
315. On April 26, 1989, Rudy Linares used a gun to keep hospital personnel from interfering while he disconnected the mechanical ventilator that was
maintaining the life of his 15-month-old son, Sammy, who was in a coma. Gilbert M. Goldman et al., What Actually Happened: An Informed Review of the Linares
Incident, 17 LAw, MED. & HEALTH CARE 298, 303 (1989) (article written to respond to criticism of hospital's actions). During the first week following the infant's injury, when it became obvious that there was extensive neurologic
damage, the Linares family requested that the ventilator be removed. Id. at 300.
The hospital refused, although it did agree to record a DNR status. Id. The
family was advised that a court order was required to discontinue the ventilator.
Id. at 302. Even the authors admit that the family was not initially encouraged to
seek such an order because the medical personnel believed that the child would
succumb to various complications. Id. The authors further admit that the family
may not have understood what was involved in the legal process or the costs of
such an action. Id. Although the hospital offered pastoral, social and counseling
services to the family, there is no indication that the family was advised about
legal processes. Id. at 301. The authors concede that the hospital should have
provided the family with legal counsel at the hospital's expense, and in fact,
since the incident, it has done so for at least one other family. Id. at 305. The
authors note that the father refused counseling services, may have had alcohol
and drug abuse problems, and had an arrest record, and that the mother was
involved in welfare fraud. Id. at 302-03. These facts are not relevant, however,
to the issue of the hospital's actions (or inaction).
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an emotionally draining illness and unschooled in law or
medicine, may be incapable of taking the steps necessary to resolve the dilemma.
Some recent statutes have been designed to avoid the necessity of a court decision before allowing termination of medical
treatment.3 1 6 These statutes, however, generally provide that termination without court intervention cannot occur if the physicians do not agree with the family. 31 7 Thus, many of these cases
still end up in court.3 1 8 Only by depriving hospitals, nursing
homes and medical personnel of standing will families be spared
the burdens of litigation.
C.

Disadvantages of Family Decisionmaking

The proposed surrogate decisionmaking statute will simplify
most medical treatment decision situations. There are five situations, however, where this proposal may not be as effective. Four
of these potential problem areas already exist under the current
systems. When a family is dysfunctional, when there is conflict
among family members, when a person has no close family members or when the family is unwilling or unable to make the decisions, judicial intervention may still be necessary to determine
whether to continue medical treatment for an incompetent person. The problem unique to this proposal is determining what
mechanism should be used when outsiders believe the family's
decision is unreasonable. The final topic in this area, titled the
right of conscience, addresses the problem of medical personnel
who refuse to defer to the wishes of the person's family.
1. The Dysfunctional Family
One disadvantage with giving families exclusive authority to
316. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, paras. 851-1 to -55 (Supp. 1992)
(clarifying process for implementing decisions to forego life-sustaining medical
treatment); IND. CODE § 16-8-12-4 (1992) (authorizing family members as primary decisionmakers).
317. For a discussion of these statutes, see supra notes 139-48 and accompanying text.
318. The court inJobes established a common-law rule that allowed termination without judicial review after two neurologists had certified that "the patient is in a persistent vegetative state and that there is no reasonable possibility
that the patient will ever recover to a cognitive, sapient state." In reJobes, 529
A.2d 434, 448 (N.Y. 1987). The court then issued this warning: "We specifically
disapprove any interpretations ... which allow[ ] 'a hospital, nursing home, [or]
treating physician[ I ... to apply for the appointment of a special medical guardian to consent to emergency treatment when a patient is unable to give consent,
that would frustrate the tenor of this opinion." Id. at 449 n.16.
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make a person's medical treatment decisions is that some families
are dysfunctional.3 1 9 The experience of the past fifteen years,
however, indicates that a dysfunctional family is unlikely to be involved in this type of case.3 20 In fact, in none of the cases from
Quinlan32 1 to Cruzan3 22 have the family members been anything
less than loving and devoted to the individual.
The dissent inJobes criticized the majority for basing its decision to allow the termination of treatment on the fact that the
family was intact.3 2 3 Justice O'Hern argued that a substantive
principle of law should not be based upon the fact that the family
is intact. 324 All abuse and neglect laws, however, are based on the
dysfunctional status of the family.
Under the proposal made in this Article, if there is an allegation of abuse, the government would have standing to intervene
to prevent the termination of medical treatment. The rebuttable
presumption that family members act in the person's best interest
allows the rare cases involving abuse to be litigated.
Similarly, some persons may not get along with their families
or may have parents who disapprove of their lifestyle. In those
cases, it may be necessary for a close friend or other surrogate
decisionmaker to seek court appointment as the surrogate to
32 5
make the decision.
319. By dysfunctional, I mean families in which there has been abuse or
neglect. That abuse may either be physical or emotional.
320. Perhaps the most likely explanation for the fact that dysfunctional families have not been involved in these cases is that these families do not wish to
draw attention to themselves. The families are more likely to accede to the
wishes of the physician rather than instigate conflict with the medical professionals. Moreover, if the patient has been the victim of abuse by the decisionmaker,
the decisionmaker may encourage maximum treatment to assuage any personal
guilt.
321. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
322. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
323. In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 464 (N.Y. 1987) (O'Hern, J., dissenting).
Justice O'Hern argued that the restraints on termination of treatment are an
effective response to the need to provide stability to a volatile family, even
though such restraints may seem unfair to a strong and loving family. Id.
(O'Hern, J., dissenting).
324. Id. (O'Hern, J., dissenting).
325. An even better choice than a friend approaching the court on his own
would obviously be for the individual to designate the friend as agent through
the use of a durable power of attorney for health care. Failing this, however, the
court should take into account the dynamics of the family and appoint the friend
as the surrogate decisionmaker.
A particularly tragic example involved the conflict between a lesbian partner
and the patient's parents. In re Kowalski, 478 N.W.2d 790 (Minn. Ct. App.
1991). For eight years, the parents and partner litigated the guardianship issue.
Id. at 791-92. For one period of more than three years, the partner was pre-
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In the final analysis there will always be problems when the
person's family is dysfunctional or when the person was involved
in a non-traditional relationship. These problems will be no
greater when the presumption is in favor of family decisionmaking than under the current system. Consequently, the existence
of dysfunctional families is no real disadvantage to the proposal.
2.

Conflict Among Family Members

A second disadvantage with giving families authority to make
decisions regarding a person's medical treatment is that family
members may disagree about the treatment that should be provided to the person. The most obvious situation occurs when the
person is an unmarried child and the statutory surrogate decisionmakers are the person's divorced parents who are unable to
agree. Similarly the person may be an elderly individual whose
statutory surrogate decisionmakers are his adult children who are
unable to agree. In these cases, the courts will probably be forced
to make the decision whether to terminate or to continue
treatment.
None of the litigated cases to date have involved such family
disagreements.3 26 Perhaps this is because litigation of this nature
requires such an emotional commitment that families who disagree do not even begin the process, but rather reach a decision
without involving the courts. A decision to terminate treatment is
not reached quickly or without much soul-searching. The decision to withdraw treatment is not made immediately after arrival
at the hospital by the first relative or friend whom the doctor can
find.3 27 Petitions to terminate treatment generally are not filed
vented by the father from even visiting the patient. Id. at 791. Only the execution of a durable power of attorney for health care could have avoided the
litigation. This type of situation would neither be solved nor exacerbated under
the proposal advocated in this Article.
326. But see Chris Conway, A Family Divided Over Life and Death As Ted Smerdon
Lies in a Coma, Relatives Are Fighting His Wife to Decide his Fate, PHILA. INQUIRER,
Mar. 23, 1992, at BI. In the Smerdon controversy, the wife of a man who has
been in a persistent vegetative state for over ten years has asked the New Jersey
courts to appoint her as guardian so that she can withdraw the artificial nutrition
and hydration sustaining her husband. Id. Her petition is being challenged by
her husband's mother and some of his siblings, who accuse the wife of "infidelity
and financial opportunism." Id. The court will need to decide the controversy
through the guardianship appointment process. See also Dolores Kong, Patient
Proxy Laws Face Hitches, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 3, 1992, at 29 (describing family
conflict in which brother, who disagreed with decision made by sister appointed
proxy by their mother, unsuccessfully petitioned probate court to have himself
named proxy).
327. Illinois legislators expressed this concern during the debate about a
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until families have lost all hope of recovery, sometimes several
years after the brain injury occurred.3 2 8 This may also explain
why families sometimes wait for so many years before seeking termination: some family members may not have been willing to
agree to terminate treatment at an earlier time. Thus, the problem of conflict among family members is not a serious disadvantage, and it certainly is not unique to the proposal.
3.

No Close Family

A third disadvantage with giving families exclusive authority
to decide on a person's medical treatment is that some individuals
do not have close family members. Many of these individuals are
elderly and live in nursing homes where the average age is eightytWo. 3 29 Furthermore, among nursing home residents, more than
half have no living descendants.3 3 0 Consequently, it is unrealistic
to expect caring family members to be involved in decisionmaking in every situation. 3 3 1
When a person has no close family member, however, it still
may be possible to resolve the dilemma without court intervenproposed surrogacy statute. For example, one legislator questioned whether a
surrogate would include a friend who happened to bring a patient to the hospital and could substitute as a decisionmaker if the medical personnel could not
reach the patient's family. ILL. 87TH GEN. ASSEMBLY H.R. TRANSCRIPTrION DEBATE 3 (May 24, 1991) (statement of Rep. Parcells). Another legislator speculated that if a too broad definition was adopted, that "as soon as the person slips
into the qualifying condition, the doctor is required to find a Surrogate, and the
surrogate's mission is to determine whether food and water and treatment
should be withdrawn." ILL. 87TH GEN. ASSEMBLY H.R. TRANSCRIFrION DEBATE 4
(June 28, 1991) (statement of Rep. McCracken).
328. See, e.g., In re Corbett, 487 So. 2d 368, 369 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)
(petition filed more than two years after patient became comatose); In re
Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d 32, 35 (Ind. 1991) (patient comatose for almost four years
before parents sought to remove feeding tube); Brophy v. New England Sinai
Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 628 (Mass. 1986) (patient was fed through gastrostomy tube for almost two years); Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988)
(en banc) (accident occurred approximately four years before petition was filed),
aff'd sub nom. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). But
see In re Colyer, 660 P.2d 738, 752 (Wash. 1983) (en banc) (Dore, J., dissenting).
Justice Dore dissented in part because only 16 days had passed between diagnosis and the family's petition to terminate treatment. Id. The difference in time
between this case and the others may be due in large part to the fact that Bertha
Colyer, at age 69, was considerably older and sicker than, for example, Nancy
Cruzan, who was 25 years old and healthy at the time of her accident. See Colyer,
660 P.2d at 740; Price, supra note 84, at Al.
329. In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1237 (NJ. 1985).
330. Id.
331. See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370
N.E.2d 417, 420 (Mass. 1977) (noting that 67-year-old retarded man's only relatives were two sisters who did not want to be involved).
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tion. For example, a close friend could act as the surrogate decisionmaker. Admittedly, even today, close friends can seek court
appointment as a guardian, although, with the cost and difficulty
of these proceedings, few are willing to commit to this undertaking. The proposed priority of decisionmakers should include a
final category of close friends. Then, so long as the physician
knows that the person has no close family members and the physician knows that this person was a close friend of the person, the
physician should follow the direction of the friend acting as a surrogate decisionmaker.
4.

Family Uncomfortable Making the Decision

Another problem present under the current systems that will
still be present under the proposal is that some family members
may feel uncomfortable, or may be unwilling to make surrogate
medical decisions for a family member. As discussed previously,
polls indicate that some people are more willing to make such
decisions for themselves than for other family members. 3 32 In addition, research studies reveal that family members are not always
able to accurately predict the resuscitation and medical care decision preferences of other family members. 333
Frequently, such reluctance on the part of family members
arises from a lack of knowledge regarding the medical care preferences of their loved ones. 3 34 The best way to eliminate such
reluctance is the encouragement of communication between families on the topic of medical decisionmaking. 3 35 The legal and
332. See Steiber, supra note 5, at 72.
333. See, e.g., Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Linda L. Emanuel, Proxy Decision Making
for Incompetent Patients:An Ethical and Empirical Analysis, 267 JAMA 2067 (1992)
(discussing research done in area of surrogate decisionmaking and noting that
such research indicates failure of proxy decisionmaking to promote patient preferences); Jan Hare et al., Agreement Between Patientsand Their Self-Selected Surrogates
on Difficult Medical Decisions, 152 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1049 (1992) (revealing
that although surrogates and patients made similar decisions regarding withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment, their decisions were affected by different factors); Uhlmann et al., supra note 42, at M 115-18 (finding that spouses were
better predictors of patient resuscitation preferences than physicians but still
overestimated patient resuscitation preferences to statistically significant level).
334. Hare et al., supra note 333, at 1049-50; Uhlmann et al., supra note 42,
at M120.
335. See, e.g., McIntyre, supra note 155, at 260 (stating that best way for
advance directives to be effective is for patient to develop comprehensive written
expression of medical care preferences or designate proxy who knows and understands patient's preferences); Uhlmann et al., supra note 42, at M120 (concluding that "discussions between surrogate decisionmakers and patients would
enhance the accuracy of substituted judgments by allowing surrogates to better
understand patients' values").
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medical communities can assist in this task by providing educational and support services to accomplish this goal.3 3 6 The Patient Self-Determination Act is an appropriate beginning. Its
effectiveness, however, is limited because under the Act, information regarding medical care decisionmaking is provided to patients at the time of admission to a health care facility, a time of
stress and concern when patients and their families may not be
33 7
able to adequately cope with the need to have such discussions.
The ultimate success of legislative enactments, such as existing
living will and durable power of attorney statutes, lies in the development of mechanisms to educate the public regarding this
right of self-determination.
In the situation where the family is uncomfortable making
medical care decisions, as in the previous three problem areas discussed, the concerns with the proposed family decisionmaking
statute are really no greater than under the current system.
Moreover, the proposed statute has the advantage of allowing decisions to be made free from judicial intervention in some circumstances when court intervention would be necessary in most
jurisdictions today.
336. See Loewy, supra note 154, at 1974. Dr. Loewy states:
Advance directives, properly used to foster true patient autonomy, have
much to recommend them. Among other things, they can (1) stimulate
patients to think about such issues; (2) allow patients to speak about
their preferences with their physician, their relatives, and their friends;
(3) permit patients either to express their wishes or to select a trusted
other who can make choices for them; and (4) help resolve some of the
fears of entrapment by the medical system. All of these advantages,
however, imply leadership by health care professionals who must carefully inform, discuss, listen to, and ultimately counsel and advise patients and their families.
Id. Patients and their families would welcome such information and the encouragement of such discussions. See F. Russell Kellogg et al., Life-Sustaining Interventions in Frail Elderly Persons; Talking About Choices, 152 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED.
2317 (1992) (reporting positive reactions by frail, homebound, elderly respondents to physician-initiated discussions concerning need of patients to consider
medical care preferences); Villaire, supra note 295, at 84-86 (describing success
of foundation started by Cruzan family to provide information to public regarding advance directives).
Educational and support services should also be provided to the families of
patients in persistent vegetative states who must navigate the current medical
and legal systems. See id. at 86; Richard W. Carlson et al., Development of a Comprehensive Supportive Care Team for the Hopelessly Ill on a University Hospital Medical Service, 259 JAMA 378 (1988) (describing program developed to meet all needs of
patient in persistent vegetative state, not just medical needs).
337. For a discussion of the Patient Self-Determination Act, see supra notes
149-56 and accompanying text.
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The Unreasonable Decision

Perhaps the most difficult problem posed by the proposal is
when a decision by the surrogate appears to be unreasonable,
favoring either continuation 33 8 or discontinuation of treatment.
In a diverse society, a wide range of alternative decisions regarding medical treatment should be acceptable. Sometimes these
choices are made based on personal views and at other times
based on religious beliefs. For example, Jehovah's Witnesses refuse to submit to blood transfusions. Some legislatures have recognized this diversity of choice in statutes that authorize durable
powers of attorney for health care. For example, under the Illinois statute, an individual can direct his agent to refuse amputations or blood transfusions on his behalf.3 39 Although most of
society probably views refusal of a blood transfusion as an unacceptable decision, this refusal should be within the range of acceptable decisions.
There may be instances, however, when a decision is so unreasonable that it should not be enforced. In response to this
problem, the standard that the court should use in reviewing a
statutory surrogate's decision should be a higher barrier than
merely "best interests." This deference to the decisionmaker is
certainly not unique to this proposal. Appellate courts routinely
defer to trial courts' factual determinations. Courts also defer to
administrative agencies in their factual determinations. These examples of deference are based on the fact that the record often
does not convey the subtle nuances of testimony on which fact
finders judge credibility. Similarly, courts should defer to family
decisions in the area of medical care because family impressions
of a person's desires often are not easily translated into
testimony.
A significant problem arises if hospitals are allowed to take
the lead in objecting to termination of treatment. Because an institution's resources are significant, it can challenge decisions
with which the administration does not agree. The doctor or hos338. Some family members wish to continue treatment after doctors have
determined that further treatment would be futile. In such a case, the Hennepin
County Medical Center sought the appointment of an independent conservator
because the patient's husband refused to consent to the removal of the respirator. Judge Denies Request to Cut Life Support, CHI. TRIB., July 2, 1991, at M3 (indicating that court refused to appoint conservator); see also Judge Rules Parents May
Keep Comatose Child Alive, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 18, 1991, at C4 (noting doctors' argument that keeping child alive was child abuse).
339. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 804-10 (1991).
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pital administrator should be required to convince a prosecuting
attorney that the family's decision constitutes abuse before the
case can be litigated.A40 A hospital or doctor should also be required to transfer the patient if they do not agree with the surrogate decisionmaker's treatment choice. If another doctor or
hospital will comply, then primafade the treatment choice is not
unreasonable.
6.

Right of Conscience

The final problem with this proposal to allow family decisionmaking is called, for lack of a better term, the right of conscience.
The right of conscience first arose in the area of abortion. Both
federal and state statutes exist that allow medical personnel to
refuse to perform or to assist in performing abortions if doing so
is contrary to their religious or moral beliefs.3 4 ' Some courts
have created a similar right of conscience in the right to die area.
For example, in Brophy, the Massachusetts court ruled that while
the patient had the right to have the gastrostomy tube removed,
the hospital and its agents were not required to remove it.342 The
hospital only had to transfer the patient pursuant to the family's
request.
It is not always practical to merely require that the hospital
340. One problem that cannot be avoided is the prosecuting attorney with a
personal agenda. Such an attorney may choose to intervene alleging abuse even
where such intervention is inappropriate. William Webster, the Attorney General of the State of Missouri, fought for years to decide the course of Nancy
Cruzan's treatment instead of allowing her parents to make treatment choices.
See Price, supra note 84, at Al.
More recently, Christine Busalacchi, a severely brain damaged woman, was
kept alive by a feeding tube in the same hospital as Nancy Cruzan. Kramer, supra
note 310, at N2. Busalacchi was injured in an automobile accident in 1987. Id.
In December 1990, her father attempted to move her to a Minnesota hospital
where a neurologist had agreed to take her case. The State of Missouri intervened to prevent the transfer. See Missouri Court Rejects Move for Comatose Woman,
N.Y. TiMEs, Mar. 6, 1991, at A18 (noting that court of appeals refused to allow
father of 20-year-old to move daughter to state where families "have more discretion in making decisions about the removal of feeding tubes and other extraordinary medical treatment"). Only when the new Attorney General, Jay
Nixon, was sworn in did the state dismiss its appeal in the case. Kramer, supra
note 310, at N2; see also In re Rosebush, 491 N.W.2d 633 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992).
In Rosebush, staff members at a hospital convinced a county prosecutor to seek a
temporary restraining order preventing a transfer of a patient whose family was
seeking to terminate life support. Id. at 678. The prosecutor intervened after
the hospital bio-ethics committee had approved the transfer. Id.
341. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (1988); Mo. REV. STAT. § 188.105 (Supp.
1993).
342. Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 638 (Mass.
1986).
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transfer the patient. For example, Elizabeth Bouvia was an indigent patient in a public hospital. Consequently, the California
Court of Appeal required the hospital to comply with her request. 343 Even when the patient is not on public assistance, it may
not be fair or practical to force the patient's family to find a facility willing to care for the patient. 344
When a person is admitted to a hospital or nursing home, the
person does not surrender the right to choose among medical
treatment alternatives.3 4 5 Although requiring medical personnel
to continue to care for an individual in this situation may be burdensome, the personnel are not being compelled to perform acts
contrary to their conscience. It is not like requiring a nurse to
participate in an abortion; it is more closely analogous to a nurse
being required to care for a person after a botched illegal
abortion.
It is a doctor's duty to provide the necessary medical facts,
and it is the person's right to make the treatment decision based
on his interpretation of those facts. 34 6 A person's right to choose
should not be frustrated simply because the doctor or hospital
disagrees with the choice. To allow a doctor to continue to provide certain treatment in the face of the person's objection merely
because the doctor believes it should be done would render the
concept of informed consent meaningless.
V.

CONCLUSION

Although cases involving the termination of medical treatment have "many layers and contexts, legal, medical, theological,
ethical, and popular, the heart" of these cases is elementary: who
343. Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 306 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986)
(holding that public hospital "may not deny her relief from pain and suffering
merely because she has chosen to exercise her fundamental right to protect what
little privacy remains to her").
344. Nursing homes may refuse to take a patient for the sole purpose of
removing tubes for artificial nutrition and hydration. See, e.g., Grace Plaza of
Great Neck, Inc. v. Elbaum, 588 N.Y.S.2d 853, 855 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (noting that when nursing home attempted to find another facility to take comatose
patient whose husband had requested removal of feeding tube, "those facilities
which were contacted 'would not admit the patient for the purpose of removing
the tube' ").
345. See In reJobes, 529 A.2d 434, 450 (NJ. 1987). The nursing home apparently did not inform NancyJobes' family about its treatment termination policy at the time of admission. Id. Furthermore, the court found no evidence that
the hospital's policy regarding termination had ever been formalized. Id.
346. In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1222 (N.J. 1985).
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rules at the person's bedside?3 4 7 "Strip away the rhetoric and the
symbols," and these cases are "contest[s] between physicians, on
the one hand, and patients and their legal advocates on the
other. ' 348 The problem is that in the very first case in this area,
the Quinlans made a pact with the devil. In the process of freeing
themselves from the domination of the medical profession, they
became enslaved to the judiciary.
In the judicial arena, the pendulum has been swinging. It has
swung from a laissez faire attitude towards the poor, the ill and
the neglected, to the position that the state as parent knows best
and should make all medical treatment decisions.3 49 The time has
now come for the pendulum to return to the middle. Families
must be allowed to control the destinies of their own members.
Only when there is reason to question the family's motivation, not
the decision, should the courts be allowed to intervene.
ROTHMAN, supra note 125, at 223.
348. Id.
349. See generally David J. Rothman, The State as Parent: Social Policy in the
Progressive Era, in GAYLIN ET AL., supra note 179, at 67-96 (analyzing consequences of treating state as if it were parent).

347.
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